Feb 19 2018

Krebs on Security 2018-02-19 10:44:49

Identity thieves who specialize in tax refund fraud have been busy of late hacking online accounts at multiple tax preparation firms, using them to file phony refund requests. Once the Internal Revenue Service processes the return and deposits money into bank accounts of the hacked firms’ clients, the crooks contact those clients posing as a collection agency and demand that the money be “returned.”

In one version of the scam, criminals are pretending to be debt collection agency officials acting on behalf of the IRS. They’ll call taxpayers who’ve had fraudulent tax refunds deposited into their bank accounts, claim the refund was deposited in error, and threaten recipients with criminal charges if they fail to forward the money to the collection agency.

This is exactly what happened to a number of customers at a half dozen banks in Oklahoma earlier this month. Elaine Dodd, executive vice president of the fraud division at the Oklahoma Bankers Association, said many financial institutions in the Oklahoma City area had “a good number of customers” who had large sums deposited into their bank accounts at the same time.

Dodd said the bank customers received hefty deposits into their accounts from the U.S. Treasury, and shortly thereafter were contacted by phone by someone claiming to be a collections agent for a firm calling itself DebtCredit and using the Web site name debtcredit[dot]us.

“We’re having customers getting refunds they have not applied for,” Dodd said, noting that the transfers were traced back to a local tax preparer who’d apparently gotten phished or hacked. Those banks are now working with affected customers to close the accounts and open new ones, Dodd said. “If the crooks have breached a tax preparer and can send money to the client, they can sure enough pull money out of those accounts, too.”

Several of the Oklahoma bank’s clients received customized notices from a phony company claiming to be a collections agency hired by the IRS.

The domain debtcredit[dot]us hasn’t been active for some time, but an exact copy of the site to which the bank’s clients were referred by the phony collection agency can be found at jcdebt[dot]com — a domain that was registered less than a month ago. The site purports to be associated with a company in New Jersey called Debt & Credit Consulting Services, but according to a record (PDF) retrieved from the New Jersey Secretary of State’s office, that company’s business license was revoked in 2010.

“You may be puzzled by an erroneous payment from the Internal Revenue Service but in fact it is quite an ordinary situation,” reads the HTML page shared with people who received the fraudulent IRS refunds. It includes a video explaining the matter, and references a case number, the amount and date of the transaction, and provides a list of personal “data reported by the IRS,” including the recipient’s name, Social Security Number (SSN), address, bank name, bank routing number and account number.

All of these details no doubt are included to make the scheme look official; most recipients will never suspect that they received the bank transfer because their accounting firm got hacked.

The scammers even supposedly assign the recipients an individual “appointed debt collector,” complete with a picture of the employee, her name, telephone number and email address. However, the emails to the domain used in the email address from the screenshot above (debtcredit[dot]com) bounced, and no one answers at the provided telephone number.

Along with the Web page listing the recipient’s personal and bank account information, each recipient is given a “transaction error correction letter” with IRS letterhead (see image below) that includes many of the same personal and financial details on the HTML page. It also gives the recipient instructions on the account number, ACH routing and wire number to which the wayward funds are to be wired.

A phony letter from the IRS instructing recipients on how and where to wire the money that was deposited into their bank account as a result of a fraudulent tax refund request filed in their name.

Tax refund fraud affects hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of U.S. citizens annually. Victims usually first learn of the crime after having their returns rejected because scammers beat them to it. Even those who are not required to file a return can be victims of refund fraud, as can those who are not actually due a refund from the IRS.

On Feb. 2, 2018, the IRS issued a warning to tax preparers, urging them to step up their security in light of increased attacks. On Feb. 13, the IRS warned that phony refunds through hacked tax preparation accounts are a “quickly growing scam.”

“Thieves know it is more difficult to identify and halt fraudulent tax returns when they are using real client data such as income, dependents, credits and deductions,” the agency noted in the Feb. 2 alert. “Generally, criminals find alternative ways to get the fraudulent refunds delivered to themselves rather than the real taxpayers.”

The IRS says taxpayer who receive fraudulent transfers from the IRS should contact their financial institution, as the account may need to be closed (because the account details are clearly in the hands of cybercriminals). Taxpayers receiving erroneous refunds also should consider contacting their tax preparers immediately.

If you go to file your taxes electronically this year and the return is rejected, it may mean fraudsters have beat you to it. The IRS advises taxpayers in this situation to follow the steps outlined in the Taxpayer Guide to Identity Theft. Those unable to file electronically should mail a paper tax return along with Form 14039 (PDF) — the Identity Theft Affidavit — stating they were victims of a tax preparer data breach.

Feb 16 2018

32 class-action suits filed against Intel over Spectre and Meltdown flaws

Enlarge / This may become the new default imagery for Spectre and Meltdown around Intel. (credit: Brian Turner / Flickr)

In its annual SEC filing, Intel has revealed that it's facing 32 lawsuits over the Spectre and Meltdown attacks on its processors. While the Spectre problem is a near-universal issue faced by modern processors, the Meltdown attack is specific to processors from Intel and Apple, along with certain ARM designs that are coming to market shortly.

Per Intel's filing, 30 of the cases are customer class-action suits from users claiming to be harmed by the flaws. While Meltdown has effective workarounds, they come with some performance cost. Workarounds for Spectre are more difficult and similarly can harm system performance.

The other two cases are securities class actions that claim that Intel made misleading public statements during the six-month period after the company was notified of the problems but before the attacks were made public.

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Feb 16 2018

Free Ransomware Available on Dark Web

The McAfee Advanced Threat Research team recently analyzed a ransomware-as-a-service threat that is available for free and without registration. This malware was first seen in July 2017 with the extension .shifr. It has now appeared in recent detections with the extension .cypher.

Ransomware-as-a-Service

Ransomware-as-a-service is a cybercrime economic model that allows malware developers to earn money for their creations without the need to distribute their threats. Nontechnical criminals buy their wares and launch the infections, while paying the developers a percentage of their take. The developers run relatively few risks, and their customers do most of the work.

Some ransomware-as-a-service, such as RaaSberry, use subscriptions while others require registration to gain access to the ransomware. The ransomware developer hosts a service on the “dark web” that allows any buyer to create and modify the malware. For example, the buyer can add custom ransom notes and the amount of the payment. More advanced services offer features such as evasion techniques to avoid detection and analysis. The service can also offer a control server with an administration panel to manage each victim. This system is convenient for both the developer, who makes money by selling malware, and for buyers, who gain ready-to-deploy ransomware without needing any specific coding knowledge.

The underground economy behind this service is well organized, effectively offering a cybercrime infrastructure. Basically, the ransomware is available on a website. The buyer sets up the ransomware by adding a wallet address. The ransomware is then available to download. The buyer just needs to customize and spread the malware. When a victim pays the ransom, a percentage is delivered both to the buyer and to the malware coder.

 

The ransomware is available on the TOR network at hxxp://kdvm5fd6tn6jsbwh.onion. A web page guides buyers through the configuration process.

On the configuration page, a generic XMPP address suggests we may have found a demo version of the ransomware.

On the page, the buyer need only to add a Bitcoin wallet address and the amount of the ransom. Once that is done, the malware is generated and can be downloaded. With this malware, the developer earns a 10% commission on every payment. Now let’s look at the malware sample.

Dynamic Analysis 

When the malware launches on the victim’s system, it checks for an Internet connection. If there is none, it exits the process. Otherwise, it contacts the following addresses to download the encryption key:

Once the file is running, it creates several files on the system:

  • Encryption_key: the RSA key encrypted in AES
  • Lock_file: an indicator that the system is encrypted
  • Uuid_file: a reference for the infected machine. A TOR address is generated with this ID.

The encryption key is downloaded from hxxps://kdvm5fd6tn6jsbwh.onion.to/new_c/xmKksHw53W433lmvNsdzGxqWLcPLA44Dyna.

The ransom note is created on the desktop.

The file “HOW_TO_DECRYPT_FILES.html” gives a link to the TOR network.

Once the files are encrypted, the ransom note is displayed in HTML and points to the TOR site hxxp://kdvm5fd6tn6jsbwh.onion/ with the ID of the infected machine.

Allegedly after payment, the victim can download the file decrypter.exe and unlock encrypted files, which have the extension .cypher.

The malware encrypts the following file extensions:

The targeted extensions include many picture and photography files related to Canon, Kodak, Sony, and others. There are also extensions for AutoCAD, Autodesk projects, scalable vector images, and Microsoft Office files. These files are mostly used by designers, photographers, architect—and many others.

Digging Deeper

The malware runs on 64-bit systems and is coded in Golang (“Go language,” from Google), a programming language similar to C with some improvements in error management. It is not common to find malware using Golang, although this is not the first time that we have analyzed such malware. This threat is pretty big compared with most other malware, larger than 5.5MB. The file size can make analysis more difficult and can also help evade hardcoded antimalware file-inspection sizes.

Reverse engineering in Golang is a bit different than other languages. Golang binaries are usually bigger than other executables. (By default, the compiler statically links the program’s libraries, resulting a bigger file.)

A drawback for attackers is that such big binaries can be easily detected on a corporate network. Large files are “noisier” and may appear suspicious when arriving from an external source. They can also be less convenient for attackers to deal with because they can make the infection process more difficult.

The first interesting function to analyze in a Golang binary is the “main_main.” The malware starts by gathering environment variables. It then checks whether the file “lock_file” exists in the directory C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming.

The function “main_Exists” will check for the file. If it does not exist, the malware exits the process.

If the file does exist, the malware downloads the public key from the control server.

The malware contacts the address  hxxps://kdvm5fd6tn6jsbwh.onion/new_c/<nameofmalware>. The encryption public key is stored directly on the website.

This address is generated when the buyer creates the ransomware on the developer’s web page; thus the same malware encrypts files with the same public key.

The malware generates the AES key and tries to find any network share by querying the letters.

This function tries to find network shares:

Before a file is encrypted, the malware creates another file in C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\uuid_file to use as a victim identifier.

The malware encrypts the files using AES and deletes them after encryption with the function “os.remove” to avoid any simple forensic recovery.

The decrypter, which can be downloaded, works in a similar way but it requests the private key that the victims must pay for at hxxps://kdvm5fd6tn6jsbwh.onion.to/get_privkey/math/big. The mechanism behind the encryption routine seems to be on the online server and the decryption key cannot be easily recovered.

The following information describes the decrypter.

Conclusion

Cybercrime-as-a-service is not new, yet it is now more widespread than ever. In this case, the malware is available for free but the ransomware developer earns a 10% fee from each victim who pays a ransom. The use of Golang is not common for malware. Most ransomware-as-a-service is not free, which could indicate this might be a demonstration version, or a proof of concept for future sale.

This malware is not advanced and was coded without evasion techniques, such as DGA, SSL for control, encryption, or even file compression. Looking at the targeted file extensions suggests the victims can range from general home or business users to the graphics industry. Although such malware is not difficult to analyze, it can be very destructive in a corporate environment.

Keep in mind that paying a ransom is no guarantee of receiving a decryption key. McAfee advises that you never pay a ransom. You can find further information and help on unlocking some ransomware threats at https://www.nomoreransom.org.

McAfee detects this threat as Ransomware-FPDS!0F8CCEE515B8.

 

Indicators of Compromise

Hashes:

  • cb73927aa749f88134ab7874b15df898c014a35d519469f59b1c85d32fa69357
  • 0622fcb172773d8939b451c43902095b0f91877ae05e562c60d0ca0c237a2e9c

IP address:

  • hxxp://kdvm5fd6tn6jsbwh.onion

Files created:

  • C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\uuid_file
  • C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\lock_file
  • C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\encryption_key
  • C:\Users\< username >\Desktop\HOW_TO_DECRYPT_FILES.html

Encryption extension:

  • .cypher

References:

https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/0622fcb172773d8939b451c43902095b0f91877ae05e562c60d0ca0c237a2e9c/analysis/

https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Ransomware+as+a+Service/23277/

 

The post Free Ransomware Available on Dark Web appeared first on McAfee Blogs.

Feb 15 2018

Krebs on Security 2018-02-15 13:11:30

Companies around the globe are scrambling to comply with new European privacy regulations that take effect a little more than three months from now. But many security experts are worried that the changes being ushered in by the rush to adhere to the law may make it more difficult to track down cybercriminals and less likely that organizations will be willing to share data about new online threats.

On May 25, 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) takes effect. The law, enacted by the European Parliament, requires technology companies to get affirmative consent for any information they collect on people within the European Union. Organizations that violate the GDPR could face fines of up to four percent of global annual revenues.

In response, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) — the nonprofit entity that manages the global domain name system — is poised to propose changes to the rules governing how much personal information Web site name registrars can collect and who should have access to the data.

Specifically, ICANN has been seeking feedback on a range of proposals to redact information provided in WHOIS, the system for querying databases that store the registered users of domain names and blocks of Internet address ranges (IP addresses).

Under current ICANN rules, domain name registrars should collect and display a variety of data points when someone performs a WHOIS lookup on a given domain, such as the registrant’s name, address, email address and phone number. (Most registrars offer a privacy protection service that shields this information from public WHOIS lookups; some registrars charge a nominal fee for this service, while others offer it for free).

In a bid to help domain registrars comply with the GDPR regulations, ICANN has floated several proposals, all of which would redact some of the registrant data from WHOIS records. Its mildest proposal would remove the registrant’s name, email, and phone number, while allowing self-certified 3rd parties to request access to said data at the approval of a higher authority — such as the registrar used to register the domain name.

The most restrictive proposal would remove all registrant data from public WHOIS records, and would require legal due process (such as a subpoena or court order) to reveal any information supplied by the domain registrant.

ICANN’s various proposed models for redacting information in WHOIS domain name records.

The full text of ICANN’s latest proposed models (from which the screenshot above was taken) can be found here (PDF). A diverse ICANN working group made up of privacy activists, technologists, lawyers, trademark holders and security experts has been arguing about these details since 2016. For the curious and/or intrepid, the entire archive of those debates up to the current day is available at this link.

WHAT IS THE WHOIS DEBATE?

To drastically simplify the discussions into two sides, those in the privacy camp say WHOIS records are being routinely plundered and abused by all manner of ne’er-do-wells, including spammers, scammers, phishers and stalkers. In short, their view seems to be that the availability of registrant data in the WHOIS records causes more problems than it is designed to solve.

Meanwhile, security experts are arguing that the data in WHOIS records has been indispensable in tracking down and bringing to justice those who seek to perpetrate said scams, spams, phishes and….er….stalks.

Many privacy advocates seem to take a dim view of any ICANN system by which third parties (and not just law enforcement officials) might be vetted or accredited to look at a domain registrant’s name, address, phone number, email address, etc. This sentiment is captured in public comments made by the Electronic Frontier Foundation‘s Jeremy Malcolm, who argued that — even if such information were only limited to anti-abuse professionals — this also wouldn’t work.

“There would be nothing to stop malicious actors from identifying as anti-abuse professionals – neither would want to have a system to ‘vet’ anti-abuse professionals, because that would be even more problematic,” Malcolm wrote in October 2017. “There is no added value in collecting personal information – after all, criminals are not going to provide correct information anyway, and if a domain has been compromised then the personal information of the original registrant isn’t going to help much, and its availability in the wild could cause significant harm to the registrant.”

Anti-abuse and security experts counter that there are endless examples of people involved in spam, phishing, malware attacks and other forms of cybercrime who include details in WHOIS records that are extremely useful for tracking down the perpetrators, disrupting their operations, or building reputation-based systems (such as anti-spam and anti-malware services) that seek to filter or block such activity.

Moreover, they point out that the overwhelming majority of phishing is performed with the help of compromised domains, and that the primary method for cleaning up those compromises is using WHOIS data to contact the victim and/or their hosting provider.

Many commentators observed that, in the end, ICANN is likely to proceed in a way that covers its own backside, and that of its primary constituency — domain registrars. Registrars pay a fee to ICANN for each domain a customer registers, although revenue from those fees has been falling of late, forcing ICANN to make significant budget cuts.

Some critics of the WHOIS privacy effort have voiced the opinion that the registrars generally view public WHOIS data as a nuisance issue for their domain registrant customers and an unwelcome cost-center (from being short-staffed to field a constant stream of abuse complaints from security experts, researchers and others in the anti-abuse community).

“Much of the registrar market is a race to the bottom, and the ability of ICANN to police the contractual relationships in that market effectively has not been well-demonstrated over time,” commenter Andrew Sullivan observed.

In any case, sources close to the debate tell KrebsOnSecurity that ICANN is poised to recommend a WHOIS model loosely based on Model 1 in the chart above.

Specifically, the system that ICANN is planning to recommend, according to sources, would ask registrars and registries to display just the domain name, city, state/province and country of the registrant in each record; the public email addresses would be replaced by a form or message relay link that allows users to contact the registrant. The source also said ICANN plans to leave it up to the registries/registrars to apply these changes globally or only to natural persons living in the European Economic Area (EEA).

In addition, sources say non-public WHOIS data would be accessible via a credentialing system to identify law enforcement agencies and intellectual property rights holders. However, it’s unlikely that such a system would be built and approved before the May 25, 2018 effectiveness date for the GDPR, so the rumor is that ICANN intends to propose a self-certification model in the meantime.

ICANN spokesman Brad White declined to confirm or deny any of the above, referring me instead to a blog post published Tuesday evening by ICANN CEO Göran Marby. That post does not, however, clarify which way ICANN may be leaning on the matter.

“Our conversations and work are on-going and not yet final,” White wrote in a statement shared with KrebsOnSecurity. “We are converging on a final interim model as we continue to engage, review and assess the input we receive from our stakeholders and Data Protection Authorities (PDAs).”

But with the GDPR compliance deadline looming, some registrars are moving forward with their own plans on WHOIS privacy. GoDaddy, one of the world’s largest domain registrars, recently began redacting most registrant data from WHOIS records for domains that are queried via third-party tools. And it seems likely that other registrars will follow GoDaddy’s lead.

ANALYSIS

For my part, I can say without hesitation that few resources are as critical to what I do here at KrebsOnSecurity than the data available in the public WHOIS records. WHOIS records are incredibly useful signposts for tracking cybercrime, and they frequently allow KrebsOnSecurity to break important stories about the connections between and identities behind various cybercriminal operations and the individuals/networks actively supporting or enabling those activities. I also very often rely on WHOIS records to locate contact information for potential sources or cybercrime victims who may not yet be aware of their victimization.

In a great many cases, I have found that clues about the identities of those who perpetrate cybercrime can be found by following a trail of information in WHOIS records that predates their cybercriminal careers. Also, even in cases where online abusers provide intentionally misleading or false information in WHOIS records, that information is still extremely useful in mapping the extent of their malware, phishing and scamming operations.

Anyone looking for copious examples of both need only to search this Web site for the term “WHOIS,” which yields dozens of stories and investigations that simply would not have been possible without the data currently available in the global WHOIS records.

Many privacy activists involved in to the WHOIS debate have argued that other data related to domain and Internet address registrations — such as name servers, Internet (IP) addresses and registration dates — should also be considered private information. My chief concern if this belief becomes more widely held is that security companies might stop sharing such information for fear of violating the GDPR, thus hampering the important work of anti-abuse and security professionals.

This is hardly a theoretical concern. Last month I heard from a security firm based in the European Union regarding a new Internet of Things (IoT) botnet they’d discovered that was unusually complex and advanced. Their outreach piqued my curiosity because I had already been working with a researcher here in the United States who was investigating a similar-sounding IoT botnet, and I wanted to know if my source and the security company were looking at the same thing.

But when I asked the security firm to share a list of Internet addresses related to their discovery, they told me they could not do so because IP addresses could be considered private data — even after I assured them I did not intend to publish the data.

“According to many forums, IPs should be considered personal data as it enters the scope of ‘online identifiers’,” the researcher wrote in an email to KrebsOnSecurity, declining to answer questions about whether their concern was related to provisions in the GDPR specifically.  “Either way, it’s IP addresses belonging to people with vulnerable/infected devices and sharing them may be perceived as bad practice on our end. We consider the list of IPs with infected victims to be private information at this point.”

Certainly as the Internet matures and big companies develop ever more intrusive ways to hoover up data on consumers, we also need to rein in the most egregious practices while giving Internet users more robust tools to protect and preserve their privacy. In the context of Internet security and the privacy principles envisioned in the GDPR, however, I’m worried that cybercriminals may end up being the biggest beneficiaries of this new law.