Category: bitcoin

Apr 03 2018

Google bans cryptomining Chrome extensions because they refuse to play by the rules

Enlarge / Mining: no longer welcome in Chrome. (credit: Jeremy Buckingham / Flickr)

After a policy that previously permitted them, Google has decided to remove any and all Chrome extensions that mine for cryptocurrencies after finding that too many developers didn't play by the company's rules.

Google allowed Chrome extensions that performed mining with the proviso that the extensions clearly disclosed that they performed mining and performed no activity but mining. About 10 percent of extensions that mined within the browser followed these rules, but some 90 percent didn't. Instead, they mined surreptitiously, driving up people's electricity bills and running down their batteries without any informed consent on the user's behalf.

In response to this continued misbehavior, Google has decided to ban any and all cryptomining extensions. Effective immediately, the Chrome Web Store will no longer accept any extensions that mine for cryptocurrencies and, starting in June, will remove any existing extensions that mine.

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Mar 12 2018

‘McAfee Labs Threats Report’ Examines Cryptocurrency Hijacking, Ransomware, Fileless Malware

Today McAfee published the McAfee Labs Threats Report: March 2018. The report looks into the growth and trends of new malware, ransomware, and other threats in Q4 2017. McAfee Labs saw on average eight new threat samples per second, and the increasing use of fileless malware attacks leveraging Microsoft PowerShell. The Q4 spike in Bitcoin value prompted cybercriminals to focus on cryptocurrency hijacking through a variety of methods, including malicious Android apps.

Each quarter, McAfee Labs, led by the Advanced Threat Research team, assesses the state of the cyber threat landscape based on threat data gathered by the McAfee Global Threat Intelligence cloud from hundreds of millions of sensors across multiple threat vectors around the world. McAfee Advanced Threat Research complements McAfee Labs by providing in-depth investigative analysis of cyberattacks from around the globe.

Cybercriminals Take on New Strategies, Tactics

The fourth quarter of 2017 saw the rise of newly diversified cybercriminals, as a significant number of actors embraced novel criminal activities to capture new revenue streams. For instance, the spike in the value of Bitcoin prompted actors to branch out from moneymakers such as ransomware, to the practice of hijacking Bitcoin and Monero wallets. McAfee researchers discovered Android apps developed exclusively for the purpose of cryptocurrency mining and observed discussions in underground forums suggesting Litecoin as a safer model than Bitcoin, with less chance of exposure.

Cybercriminals also continued to adopt fileless malware leveraging Microsoft PowerShell, which surged 432% over the course of 2017, as the threat category became a go-to toolbox. The scripting language was used within Microsoft Office files to execute the first stage of attacks.

Health Care Targeted

Although publicly disclosed security incidents targeting health care decreased by 78% in the fourth quarter of 2017, the sector experienced a dramatic 210% overall increase in incidents in 2017. Through their investigations, McAfee Advanced Threat Research analysts conclude many incidents were caused by organizational failure to comply with security best practices or address known vulnerabilities in medical software.

McAfee Advanced Threat Research analysts looked into possible attack vectors related to health care data, finding exposed sensitive images and vulnerable software. Combining these attack vectors, analysts were able to reconstruct patient body parts, and create three-dimensional models.

Q4 2017 Threats Activity

Fileless malware. In Q4 JavaScript malware growth continued to slow with new samples decreasing by 9%, while new PowerShell malware more than tripled, growing 267%.

Security incidents. McAfee Labs counted 222 publicly disclosed security incidents in Q4, a decrease of 15% from Q3. 30% of all publicly disclosed security incidents in Q4 took place in the Americas, followed by 14% in Europe and 11% in Asia.

Vertical industry targets. Public, health care, education, and finance, respectively, led vertical sector security incidents for 2017.

  • Health Care. Disclosed incidents experienced a surge in 2017, rising 210%, while falling 78% in Q4.
  • Public sector. Disclosed incidents decreased 15% in 2017, down 37% in Q4.
  • Disclosed incidents rose 125% in 2017, remaining stagnant in Q4.
  • Disclosed incidents rose 16% in 2017, falling 29% in Q4. 

Regional targets

  • Disclosed incidents rose 46% in 2017, falling 46% in Q4.
  • Disclosed incidents fell 58% in 2017, rising 28% in Q4.
  • Disclosed incidents fell 20% in 2017, rising 18% in Q4.
  • Disclosed incidents rose 42% in 2017, falling 33% in Q4. 

Attack vectors. In Q4 and 2017 overall, malware led disclosed attack vectors, followed by account hijacking, leaks, distributed denial of service, and code injection.

Ransomware. The fourth quarter saw notable industry and law enforcement successes against criminals responsible for ransomware campaigns. New ransomware samples grew 59% over the last four quarters, while new ransomware samples growth rose 35% in Q4. The total number of ransomware samples increased 16% in the last quarter to 14.8 million samples.

Mobile malware. New mobile malware decreased by 35% from Q3. In 2017 total mobile malware experienced a 55% increase, while new samples declined by 3%.

Malware overall. New malware samples increased in Q4 by 32%. The total number of malware samples grew 10% in the past four quarters.

Mac malware. New Mac OS malware samples increased by 24% in Q4. Total Mac OS malware grew 243% in 2017.

Macro malware. New macro malware increased by 53% in Q4, declined by 35% in 2017.

Spam campaigns. 97% of spam botnet traffic in Q4 was driven by Necurs—recent purveyor of “lonely girl” spam, pump-and-dump stock spam, and Locky ransomware downloaders—and by Gamut—sender of job offer–themed phishing and money mule recruitment emails.

For more information on these threat trends and statistics, please visit:

Twitter @Raj_Samani & @McAfee_Labs.

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Mar 12 2018

McAfee Researchers Analyze Dark Side of Cryptocurrency Craze: Its Effect on Cybercrime

In December 2017 Bitcoin values skyrocketed, peaking at the unprecedented amount of roughly US$19,000 per coin. Unsurprisingly, the market for cryptocurrencies exploded in response. Investors, companies, and even the public found a fresh interest in digital currencies. However, the exciting change in Bitcoin value did not just influence your average wealth seeker. It also influenced vast underground cybercriminal markets, malware developers, and cybercriminal behavior.

Blessing and Curse

The surge of Bitcoin popularity and price per coin piqued the interest of cybercriminals, driving cryptocurrency hijacking in the last quarter of 2017. However, the same popularity and price jump also created a headache for bad actors. Ransomware techniques and the buying and selling of goods became problematic. The volatility of the Bitcoin market makes ransom costs hard to predict at the time of infection and costs can surge upwards of $28 per transaction, complicating a criminal campaign. The volatility made mining, the act of using system resources to “mint” cryptocurrency, exceedingly difficult and raised transaction prices. This was especially true for Bitcoin, due its high hash rate of the network. (The higher the hash rate, the more people they compete against.)

Cybercriminals will always seek to combine the highest returns in the shortest time with the least risk. With the Bitcoin surge, malware developers and underground markets found themselves in need of more stability, prompting a switch to other currencies and a resurgence of old techniques.

It is far easier to mine small currencies because the hash rate is generally more manageable and hardware requirements can be more accessible depending on the network design. Monero, for example, is ASIC resistant, meaning that while mining specialized hardware does not have an overwhelming advantage to nonspecialized hardware. This allows the average computer to be more effective at the task. Due to this advantage, Monero is actively mined in mass by criminals using web-based miners on the machines of unsuspecting visitors. This intrusion is known as cryptojacking, which works by hijacking the browser session to use system resources. A quick look at recent examples of cryptojacking throws light on this issue. Starting mid-2017, there have been a slew of instances in which major websites have found themselves compromised and unwittingly hosting the code, turning their users into mining bots. The public Wi-Fi at a Starbucks outlet was found to hijack browsers to mine Monero. Even streaming services such as YouTube have been affected through infected ads. Ironically, Monero is said to be one of the most private cryptocurrencies. Attacks such as these have also happened on Bitcoin, NEM, and Ethereum.

Criminals are also leveraging techniques beyond mining, such as cryptocurrency address or wallet hijacking. For example, Evrial, a Trojan for sale on underground markets, watches the Windows clipboard and replaces any cryptocurrency wallet addresses with its own malicious address. Essentially, this hijacks a user’s intended payment address to redirect funds. Unwitting users could accidentally pay a bad actor, losing their coins with essentially no chance of recovery.

A Brief Timeline

Cybercriminals have always faced the difficulty of securing their profits from government eyes. For the cybercriminal, banks present risk. If a transfer is deemed illegal or fraudulent, the bank transfer can easily be traced and seized by the bank or law enforcement. Trading in traditional currencies requires dealing with highly regulated entities that have a strong motivation to follow the rules. Any suspicious activity on their systems could easily result in the seizure of funds. Cybercriminals have long tried to solve this problem using various digital currencies, the prelude to cryptocurrencies. When cryptocurrencies were introduced to the world, cybercriminals were quick to adapt. However, with this adoption came Trojans, botnets, and other hacker activities designed specifically for the new technology.

The evolution of digital currencies. Despite various attacks from bad actors, digital money continues to evolve.

1996: E-gold appeared, and quickly became popular with cybercriminals due to its lack of verification on accounts. This was certainly welcome among “carder groups” such as ShadowCrew, which trafficked in stolen credit cards and other financial accounts. However, with three million accounts, e-gold’s popularity among criminals also caused its demise: It was taken down just 10 years later by the FBI, even after attempts in 2005 to rein in criminal activity. Accounts were seized and the founder indicted, collapsing all e-gold operations.

2005: Needing another avenue after the collapse of e-gold, cybercriminals migrated to WebMoney, established in 1998. Unlike e-gold, WebMoney successfully discouraged the bulk of cybercriminals by modifying business practices to prevent illegal activities. This kept the organization alive but pushed many cybercriminals to find a new payment system.

2006: Liberty Reserve took on much of the burgeoning cybercriminal demand. The institution got off to a rocky start with cybercriminals due to the almost immediate arrest of its founders. The company’s assets were seized in 2013—causing an estimated $6 billion in lost criminal funds.

2009: Cybercriminals were increasingly desperate for a reliable and safe payment system. Enter Bitcoin, a decentralized, pseudo-anonymous payment system built on blockchain technology. With WebMoney usage growing increasingly difficult for cybercriminals and Liberty Reserve under scrutiny from world governments, cybercriminals required something new. Within the Bitcoin network, no central authority had the power to make decisions or otherwise seize funds. These protections against centralized seizures, as well as many of its anonymity features, were a major influence in the migration of cybercriminals to Bitcoin.

Game Changers

By 2013 cybercriminals had a vested interest in cryptocurrencies, primarily Bitcoin. Cryptocurrency-related malware was in full swing, as evidenced by increasingly sophisticated botnet miner kits such as BitBot. Large enterprises such as Silk Road, primarily a drug market, thrived on the backbone of cryptocurrency popularity. Then three major events dramatically changed the way cybercriminals operated.

Silk Road closed: The popular black market and first major modern cryptocurrency “dark net” market was shut down by the FBI. The market was tailored to drug sales, and the FBI takedown left its buyers and sellers without a place to sell their goods. The migration of buyers and sellers to less restrictive markets enabled cross-sales to a much larger audience than was previously available to cybercriminals. Buyers of drugs could now also buy stolen data—including Netflix accounts or credit cards—from new markets such as AlphaBay as demand increased.

Major retailers breached: Millions of credit card records were stolen and available, raising the demand for underground markets to buy and sell the data. Dark net markets already offering malware and other goods and services took up the load. Agora, Black Market Reloaded and, shortly thereafter, AlphaBay responded to that demand. Although many of these markets were scams, a few such as AlphaBay, which survived until its July 2017 takedown, were hugely successful. Through these markets, cybercriminals had access to a much larger audience and could benefit from centralized structures and advertising. The demand for other types of stolen data rose even more, particularly streaming media accounts and personally identifiable information, which carries a high financial return for cybercriminals.

In the past, many of the credit card records were sold on forums and other specialized carding sites, such as Rescator. The new supply of credit card data was so massive, however, that it enabled secondhand sales and migration into broader markets. Dark net markets were simply more scalable than forums, thus enabling their further growth. New players joining the game now had easy access to goods, stolen data, and customers. This shift reshaped and enabled retail targeting as it exists today.

Cryptocurrency-based ransomware introduced: Outside of dark net markets, malware developers sought to acquire cryptocurrencies. Prior to 2013 the primary method to maliciously acquire coin was through mining. Less effective methods included scams, such as TOR-clone sites, fake markets, or Trojans designed to steal private keys to wallets. By late 2013 malware developers and botnet owners sold their malware at a premium by including mining software alongside the usual items such as credit cards and password scrapers. However, at a cost of around $250 per coin, Bitcoin miners did not immediately see higher profits than they could manage with focused scraper malware. Criminals needed more reliable ways of acquiring coins.

Ransomware, a potentially lucrative form of malware, was already on the rise using other digital currencies. In late 2013, the major ransomware family CryptoLocker included a new option for ransomware victims—to pay via Bitcoin. The tactic effectively created a frenzy of copycat malware. Now malware developers could outpace the profits of scraper malware as well as secure currency for the underground market. Ransomware quickly enjoyed several immensely successful campaigns, many of which, including Locky and Samsa, are still popular. Open-source tools such as Hidden Tear allowed low-skilled players to enter the market and acquire cryptocurrencies through ransomware with only limited coding knowledge. The thriving model ransomware as a service emerged with TOX, sold via a TOR hidden service in 2015.

The use of cryptocurrencies by malicious actors has grown substantially since their inception in 2009. Cryptocurrencies meet a need and have been exploited in ever-evolving ways since their introduction. The influence of cryptocurrencies on underground markets, malware development, and attackers behavior cannot be understated. As markets change and adopt cryptocurrencies, we will surely see further responses from cybercriminals.


“Dynamic Changes in Underground Markets,” by Charles McFarland. Cyber Security Practitioner, Vol. 2, Issue 11. November 2016.

The post McAfee Researchers Analyze Dark Side of Cryptocurrency Craze: Its Effect on Cybercrime appeared first on McAfee Blogs.

Feb 12 2018

Lazarus Resurfaces, Targets Global Banks and Bitcoin Users

This blog was written with support and contributions provided by Asheer Maholtra, Jessica Saavedra Morales, and Thomas Roccia.

McAfee Advanced Threat Research (ATR) analysts have discovered an aggressive Bitcoin-stealing phishing campaign by the international cybercrime group Lazarus that uses sophisticated malware with long-term impact.

This new campaign, dubbed HaoBao, resumes Lazarus’ previous phishing emails, posed as employee recruitment, but now targets Bitcoin users and global financial organizations. When victims open malicious documents attached to the emails, the malware scans for Bitcoin activity and then establishes an implant for long-term data-gathering.

HaoBao targets and never-before-seen implants signal to McAfee ATR an ambitious campaign by Lazarus to establish cryptocurrency cybercrime at a sophisticated level.


Beginning in 2017, the Lazarus group heavily targeted individuals with spear phishing emails impersonating job recruiters which contained malicious documents. The campaign lasted from April to October and used job descriptions relevant to target organizations, in both English and Korean language. The objective was to gain access to the target’s environment and obtain key military program insight or steal money. The 2017 campaign targets ranged from defense contractors to financial institutions, including crypto currency exchanges, however; much of this fake job recruitment activity ceased months later, with the last activity observed October 22, 2017.


On January 15th , McAfee ATR discovered a malicious document masquerading as a job recruitment for a Business Development Executive located in Hong Kong for a large multi-national bank. The document was distributed via a Dropbox account at the following URL:


This is the mark of a new campaign, though it utilizes techniques, tactics and procedures observed in 2017. This document had the last author ‘Windows User’ and was created January 16, 2018 with Korean language resources. Several additional malicious documents with the same author appeared between January 16 though January 24, 2018.

Document summary from Virus Total


Malicious job recruitment documents

Victims are persuaded to enable content through a notification claiming the document was created in an earlier version of Microsoft Word. The malicious documents then launch an implant on the victim’s system via a Visual Basic macro.

Malicious Microsoft Word document


Implants dropped in campaign

The document (7e70793c1ca82006775a0cac2bd75cc9ada37d7c) created January 24, 2018 drops and executes an implant compiled January 22, 2018 with the name lsm.exe (535f212b320df049ae8b8ebe0a4f93e3bd25ed79). The implant lsm.exe contacted which also resolves to dropped in campaign

The other malicious document ( a79488b114f57bd3d8a7fa29e7647e2281ce21f6) created January 19, 2018 drops the implant (afb2595ce1ecf0fdb9631752e32f0e32be3d51bb); which is 99% similar-to the lsm.exe implant.

This document was distributed from the following Dropbox URLs:

  • hxxps://
  • hxxps:// description.doc?dl=1
HTTP response for job description document

This implant (csrss.exe) compiled January 15, 2018 contacts an IP address which resolves to We identified that this domain was used to host a malicious document from a previous 2017 campaign targeting the Sikorsky program.

  • hxxp://

A third malicious document (dc06b737ce6ada23b4d179d81dc7d910a7dbfdde) created January 19, 2018 drops e8faa68daf62fbe2e10b3bac775cce5a3bb2999e which is compiled January 15, 2018. This implant communicates to a South Korean IP address which resolves to

McAfee ATR analysis finds the dropped implants have never been seen before in the wild and have not been used in previous Lazarus campaigns from 2017. Furthermore, this campaign deploys a one-time data gathering implant that relies upon downloading a second stage to gain persistence. The implants contain a hardcoded word “haobao” that is used as a switch when executing from the Visual Basic macro.

Malicious Document Analysis

The malicious document contains two payloads as encrypted string arrays embedded in Visual Basic macro code. The payloads are present as encrypted string arrays that are decrypted in memory, written to disk and launched in sequence (second stage malicious binary launched first and then the decoy document).

The VBA Macro code is self-executing and configured to execute when the OLE document (MS Word doc) is opened (via “Sub AutoOpen()”). The AutoOpen() function in the VBA Macro performs the following tasks in the sequence listed:

  • Decodes the target file path of the second stage binary payload. This file path is calculated based on the current user’s Temp folder location:


VB code to decrypt second stage filepath
  • Decodes the second stage binary in memory and writes it to the %temp%\.\lsm.exe file location
second stage binary (MZ) as an encrypted String Array in the VBA Macro
second stage binary (MZ) decoded in memory by the VBA Macro
  • After writing the second stage payload to disk the VBA code performs two important actions.
    • Runs the second stage payload using cmd.exe. This is done so that the cmd.exe process exists as soon as the payload is launched. This way a process enumeration tool cannot find the parent process => Smaller footprint.

cmdline for executing the second stage binary:

cmd.exe /c start /b <temp_dir_path>\.\lsm.exe /haobao

  • Adds persistence on the system by creating a shortcut in the user’s Startup folder with the correct cmdline arguments:

Link file command line: <temp_dir_path>\.\lsm.exe /haobao

Link File Name: GoogleUpdate.lnk

Trigger code for executing the second stage binary and establishing persistence


LNK file configuration for establishing persistence
  • Once the second stage payload has been launched, the VBA Macro proceeds to display a decoy document to the end user. This decoy document is also stored in the VBA Macro as an encrypted string array (similar to the second stage payload). The decoy document is again written to the user’s temp directory to the following filename/path:

<temp_dir_path>\.\Job Description.doc

Decoy Document decoded in memory by the VBA Macro
  • Once the decoy document has been written to disk, the VBA Macro sets its file attributes to System + Hidden
  • The decoy document is then opened by the malicious VBA Macro and the original malicious document’s caption is copied over to the decoy document to trick the end user into mistaking the decoy document for the original (malicious) document.
  • This activity, combined with the fact that the VBA Macro then closes the current (malicious) document, indicates that the VBA Macro aims to trick an unsuspecting user into thinking that the decoy document currently open is the original (malicious) document opened by the user.
  • Since the decoy document is a benign file and does not contain any macros the victim does not suspect any malicious behavior.

Implant Analysis

As part of the implant initialization activities the implant does the following;

  • Checks the string passed to it through command line
    • “/haobao” in case of 535f212b320df049ae8b8ebe0a4f93e3bd25ed79
    • “/pumpingcore” in case of e8faa68daf62fbe2e10b3bac775cce5a3bb2999e

If the malware does not find this string in its cmdline arguments, it simply quits without going any further.

  • Unwraps a DLL into memory and calls its one-and-only import using Reflective DLL injection. DLL information.

During our research, we discovered additional variants of the DLL file.

DLL information


  • As part of Reflective DLL loading the malware performs the following tasks on the DLL it has unwrapped in memory:
    • Copy the unwrapped DLL into new locations in its own memory space.
    • Build imports required by the DLL (based on the IAT of the DLL)
Imports builder code in malware for the DLL imports
  • Call the newly loaded DLL image’s Entry Point (DllMain) with DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH to complete successful loading of the DLL in the malware process.
DLL Entry Point Call from malware to finish loading of the DLL in memory
  • Call the actual malicious export in the DLL named “CoreDn”
Hardcoded DLL export name “CoreDn” in malware

All the malicious activities described below are performed by the DLL unless specified otherwise.

Data Reconnaissance

The implant has the capability of gathering data from the victim’s system. The following information will be gathered and sent to the command and control server.

  • Computer name and currently logged on user’s name, stored in the format

<ComputerName> \ <Username>

Malware obtaining the computer name and user name
  • List of all processes currently running on the system arranged in format

<Process Name>\r\n

<Process Name>\r\n

<Process Name>\r\n

<Process Name>\r\n

Malware collecting process information from endpoint
  • The presence of a specific registry key on the system


  • The malware appends an indicator (flag) specifying whether the above registry key was found in the user’s registry:

This key is checked again as part of the command and control communication and is sent as a duplicate value to the command and control in the HTTP POST request as well (explained in the below).

Malware checking for the presence of the registry key



In preparation of the exfiltration of information collected from the endpoint, the malware performs the following activities:

  • Encode the collected information using a simple byte based XOR operation using the byte key: 0x34.
  • Base64 encode (standard) the XORed data.
  • Again, check for the presence of the Registry Key: HKCU\Software\Bitcoin\Bitcoin-Qt


Command and Control Server Communication

Once the malware has performed all these activities it sends an HTTP POST request to the CnC server:

  • www[dot] for md5 BDAEDB14723C6C8A4688CC8FC1CFE668
  • www[dot] for md5 D4C93B85FFE88DDD552860B148831026


In the format:

HTTP POST to www[dot]




HTTP POST to www[dot]



idx= 20 (14h) if the Registry key does not exist; 24 (18h) if the key exists.

no= XORed + base64 encoded “<Computername> \ <username>”

mode= XORed + base64 encoded Process listing + Registry key flag

Command and control server domain


The persistence mechanism of the malware is performed only for the downloaded implant. Persistence is established for the implant via the visual basic macro code initially executed upon document loading by the victim. This persistence is also performed ONLY if the malware successfully executes the downloaded implant. The malware first tries to update the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE registry key.

If the update is unsuccessful then it also tries to update the HKEY_CURRENT_USER registry key. Value written to registry to achieve persistence on the endpoint:

Registry Subkey = Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

Value Name = AdobeFlash

Value Content = “C:\DOCUME~1\<username>\LOCALS~1\Temp\OneDrive.exe” kLZXlyJelgqUpKzP

Registry based persistence of the second stage payload

Connections to 2017 campaigns

The techniques, tactics and procedures are very similar to the campaigns that targeted US Defense contractors, US Energy sector, financial organizations and crypto currency exchanges in 2017.

The same Windows User author appeared back in 2017 in two malicious documents 비트코인_지갑주소_및_거래번호.doc and 비트코인 거래내역.xls which were involved in crypto currency targeting. Furthermore, one of the implants communicates to an IP address that was involved in hosting malicious job description documents in 2017 involving the Sikorsky military program.

McAfee Advanced Threat research determines with confidence that Lazarus is the threat group behind this attack for the following reasons:

  • Contacts an IP address / domain that was used to host a malicious document from a Lazarus previous campaign in 2017
  • Same author appeared in these recent malicious documents that also appeared back in Lazarus 2017 campaigns
  • Uses the same malicious document structure and similar job recruitment ads as what we observed in past Lazarus campaigns
  • The techniques, tactics and procedures align with Lazarus group’s interest in crypto currency theft


In this latest discovery by McAfee ATR, despite a short pause in similar operations, the Lazarus group targets crypto currency and financial organizations. Furthermore, we have observed an increased usage of limited data gathering modules to quickly identify targets for further attacks. This campaign is tailored to identifying those who are running Bitcoin related software through specific system scans.


 Indicators of Compromise

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

  • Data encoding
  • Data encrypted
  • Command-Line Interface
  • Account discovery
  • Process Discovery
  • Query registry
  • Hidden files and directories
  • Custom cryptographic protocol
  • Registry Run Keys / Start Folder
  • Startup Items
  • Commonly used port
  • Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel




  • hxxps://
  • hxxps:// description.doc?dl=1


  • dc06b737ce6ada23b4d179d81dc7d910a7dbfdde
  • a79488b114f57bd3d8a7fa29e7647e2281ce21f6
  • 7e70793c1ca82006775a0cac2bd75cc9ada37d7c
  • 535f212b320df049ae8b8ebe0a4f93e3bd25ed79
  • 1dd8eba55b16b90f7e8055edca6f4957efb3e1cd
  • afb2595ce1ecf0fdb9631752e32f0e32be3d51bb
  • e8faa68daf62fbe2e10b3bac775cce5a3bb2999e

McAfee Detection

  • BackDoor-FDRO!
  • Trojan-FPCQ!
  • RDN/Generic Downloader.x
  • RDN/Generic Dropper
  • RDN/Generic.dx

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