Category: computer security

Aug 14 2018

Microsoft Cortana Allows Browser Navigation Without Login: CVE-2018-8253

A locked Windows 10 device with Cortana enabled on the lock screen allows an attacker with physical access to the device to do two kinds of unauthorized browsing. In the first case, the attacker can force Microsoft Edge to navigate to an attacker-controlled URL; in the second, the attacker can use a limited version of Internet Explorer 11 using the saved credentials of the victim.

In June we published our analysis of a full login bypass mechanism for all Windows 10 devices for which Cortana is enabled on the lock screen. (This is still the default option.) The discovery of the full login bypass was part of a wider research effort into what access the digital assistant Cortana might offer to an adversary when the device is locked. This post details these two additional issues; we reported them to Microsoft at the same time we reported the login bypass. The two new flaws have now been addressed as part of Microsoft’s August update. Some of the issues are also partially mitigated by modifying the answer obtained from a Bing search query.

In the first scenario, a Cortana privilege escalation leads to forced navigation on a lock screen. The vulnerability does not allow an attacker to unlock the device, but it does allow someone with physical access to force Edge to navigate to a page of the attacker’s choosing while the device is still locked. This is not a case of BadUSB, man in the middle, or rogue Wi-Fi, just simple voice commands and interacting with the device’s touchscreen or mouse.

Several months ago, researchers from Israel demonstrated a similar attack using a BadUSB device, masquerading as a network interface card to inject content into trusted HTTP sites while using Cortana to force navigation. Microsoft has since removed this ability to navigate directly to a domain and instead now opens a search in Bing over HTTPS to the domain in question. Some of our findings could also be combined with a BadUSB approach.

We explored whether one could still force navigation to an attacker-controlled page. In short, yes, one can, but it does take some extra effort.

Cortana is very helpful when it comes to defining terms, or looking up corporations, movies, artists, or athletes. She can even do math. However, Cortana’s behavior and the answers she gives are affected by the way you ask a question. For example, if you were to ask the colloquial question “Hey Cortana, what is McAfee?” you would get a quick answer directly from a Bing search. If, however, you asked only “Hey Cortana, McAfee,” you would receive a more detailed response, including links to various trusted sites. These include Wikipedia, Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, and the “official website” (more later on this important link).

Cortana’s answers to similar but not identical queries about “McAfee.”

It is surprising that links are offered and clickable when the device is locked. If you start your favorite network sniffer or man-in-the-middle proxy, you will see that the links are visited as soon as the user clicks on them, irrespective of the device’s locked status.

This means we can force navigation to a website (though not yet the one we want) when the device is locked. However, we have seen that Cortana can be picky in how she offers results. Bing must already know these results, and most links are known trusted sites.

That leaves us with the official website. You might recognize this terminology: It is a common link presented by Wikipedia. If you look at the bottom of a Wikipedia article, you will often find a link to an official website.

Could Cortana just use Wikipedia as a trusted source? After a few delightful conversations with her, we can confirm that the official website for items she refers from Wikipedia is indeed the same as the Official Website link on Wikipedia. There is no one-to-one correlation on Wikipedia’s official website for Cortana to display the corresponding link. We assume there is some possible weighting of the domain name or logic in the Bing output that influences Cortana’s displayed links.

We can leverage this information to craft a fake Wikipedia entry, add enough content to get the review to succeed, add an official website link, and see what Cortana presents. Wikipedia reviewers do a pretty good job of vetting content, but we also need Bing to become aware of the entry so that Cortana could offer the answer and the link. Because of the time-dependent factor of the approach (and the ethical aspect of tampering with Wikipedia content in a malicious way), we decided to take a different path—although others could use this attack vector.

Instead of creating an entry in Wikipedia, making sure that Bing indexes it and that Cortana provides the official website link, we opted for an alternative. We can instead hunt Wikipedia for unmaintained or dead official website links. Fortunately for us, Wikipedia maintains a list of “dead links” and “permanent dead links.” A search for “Xbox Linux” looks like this:

To aid in our hunt, Wikipedia has a fairly robust search engine that accepts regular expressions.

With just a little bit of tinkering we come up with the following search:

insource:/\{official (website)?\|https?\:\/\/[^}]+\.com\/[^}]\}\}\{\{dead link/

This is neither an exhaustive list, nor the most efficient regular expression, but it does find some candidates without triggering the Wikipedia query timeout.

The next step is to write a script to parse the output, grab a list of domains, and check whether they are actually vacant. Many of them are still registered but do not serve any content; others are live despite the “dead link” tag. We end up with a list of domains, some more expensive than others, that are vacant.

What will Cortana display for each of these Wikipedia entries? One after another, we ask. Retrospectively, writing a text-to-speech script would have been faster. Cortana answers surprisingly well to other digital speech synthesizers.

Many of the entries do not provide the official website link, but some do. It is annoying that the way you ask the question interferes with the results. Not only is the phrasing of the question important; the decision of whether to dictate a word or spell it out may change the answer. To obtain the answer you want from Cortana, you may have to combine both approaches.

For example, we asked “Hey Cortana, what is Miss Aruba?” We saw, while the device was locked, the following answer:

The official website link points to “hxxp://” A quick search shows the domain is still available.

In conclusion, we now have Wikipedia articles for which Cortana will display an official website link, and for which the domain is available for purchase. After spending $11.99 for a cheaper domain, we own one.

Although it took some regular-expression authoring, some scripting, and buying a domain, this method was faster and more satisfying than waiting for Bing to publish and index a new Wikipedia entry.

After this setup, what can we accomplish? We can ask Cortana (either via the interactive icon or vocal command “Hey Cortana”) to conduct a search while the device is locked. When she replies, we can click on the official website link and observe as Edge retrieves the content while the device remains locked.  To put a malicious spin on this unauthorized access, we have at least one straightforward option. We could install the latest exploit kit on our newly acquired domain and infect any locked Windows 10 PC with Cortana enabled without ever logging in. This attack could occur at a coffee shop, retailer, bank, or against targeted individuals. This configuration is the default on Windows, and our research has shown that many users never disable Cortana from the lock screen.

Digital voice assistants can be useful, but they must also be considered an attack vector. Although some may think this is a “noisy” vector, not applicable when stealth is required, you can employ techniques such as the DolphinAttack, which uses inaudible voice commands to close an air gap. Or if you have physical access to the device, a $5 3.5mm-jack cable will do as well.

An inexpensive 3.5mm-jack cable for silent interaction.

How can we protect against this attack vector? You can disable Cortana on your lock screen. Microsoft should not allow navigation to untrusted websites until it receives permission from the authenticated user, confirming on login that the user wants to visit a site.

Self-service Internet Explorer from the Windows lock screen

When we investigate a technology, we sometimes find that our initial findings are less substantial than what we learn after further investigation. Our research into Cortana and this attack surface was no different. What if one could surf the web freely with a full-fledged browser such as Internet Explorer 11, with access to cached credentials and autocomplete on a locked Windows 10 device? All thanks to Cortana? That could be much more impactful than browsing to just one URL.

That is possible with Cortana’s skills. It makes sense that Cortana offers skills similar to those of Amazon’s Alexa or Google Assistant. But it does not make sense to offer these skills directly from the lock screen when they are not yet configured.

One example is the “Real Estate Search” skill. While conversing with Cortana to analyze the capabilities she could offer an attacker, we found that she occasionally offered to try skills, including Real Estate Search.

One easy trigger is to ask “Hey Cortana, I want to sell my house.” This leads to the following screen:

If we click “Real Estate Search,” we get a login screen. Instead of logging in, let’s look at the other links offered by the interface. In the current case, the “Privacy Policy” link seems interesting:

Cortana’s skill login screen with a link to Privacy Policy.

Opening the link, we see a lengthy policy. If we scroll to the bottom of the page, we discover a few social media icons:

Privacy policy screen with links to social media sites.

These icons are indeed links, allowing us to reach Facebook or YouTube, and from there the rest of the Internet:

Reaching Facebook from the lock screen of a Windows 10 system.

Let’s summarize. You left for lunch with your new Windows Surface Book locked on your desk. Cortana is on by default on your lock screen. Your disk is encrypted. What could go wrong?

Anybody who has physical access to your locked device can start browsing the web. What if someone were to navigate to a work-unfriendly website from your device, or post inflammatory comments in a public forum that could be attributed to your device’s IP address?

A device-specific attribution would be bad, but could you use the same method to post or access something from a real person’s name or account? We next investigated which browser is being used? Is it a Cortana custom browser? Is it a sandboxed Microsoft Edge? It is actually a customized Internet Explorer 11 restricted engine running in the context of AuthHost.exe. (We will publish another analysis on this limited “browser” because its properties and lack of security mechanisms could become handy for red teams.)

This is the Internet Explorer engine and not the full browser, though both JavaScript and cookies are enabled. Worse, this incarnation shares the autocomplete and credentials saved in the context of the current user’s Internet Explorer session.

Thus in addition to posting a comment on a public forum from another user’s device while the device is locked, you can also impersonate the user thanks to its cached credentials.

One potential attack scenario arises if a corporation offers a mechanism to reset Windows credentials via a web server but does not require users to reenter the old password. One could simply navigate to the reset link, input a new password, exit the limited navigator, and unlock the device with the newly set password, all from a locked computer.

We have explored a couple of attack scenarios and security issues in this post, and we will continue our investigation into Cortana and other digital assistants as an attack vector. Your best mitigation at this point is to turn off Cortana on the lock screen. Here is a good tutorial on how to do so.


The post Microsoft Cortana Allows Browser Navigation Without Login: CVE-2018-8253 appeared first on McAfee Blogs.

Jun 19 2018

McAfee Labs – McAfee Blogs 2018-06-19 00:01:25

Every week we read about adversaries attacking their targets as part of online criminal campaigns. Information gathering, strategic advantage, and theft of intellectual property are some of the motivations. Besides these, we have seen during the past two years an increase in attacks in which adversaries are not shy of leaving a trail of destruction. One might wonder how to deal with these kinds of threats and where to start.

Sun Tzu’s The Art of War contains some great wisdom regarding the strategy of warfare. One of the most popular is the advice “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

Applying this advice to information security, let’s focus first on knowing yourself. Knowing yourself can roughly be divided into two parts:

  • What do I have that can be of value to an attacker?
  • How do I detect, protect, and correct any threats to my identified value?

Every company has a value, it takes only one criminal mind to see that and to attempt to exploit it. Ask yourself what the core of your business is, the secret sauce that people might be after, what will take you out of business, whom you are doing business with, who are your clients, etc.

Once you have identified your organization’s value, the second part of knowing yourself comes into play. You must understand where you to focus your defenses and invest in technology to detect and protect against threats.

After wrapping up the knowing yourself part, what can we learn from the enemy? Ask yourself “Who would likely be interested in attacking me?” By going through the list of known adversaries and cybercriminal groups, you can create a list based on which geographies and vectors they target and classify them by risk. Here is a simplified example:

Once you have your list and risk classification ready, you must next study the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by these adversaries. For mapping their techniques and associated campaigns, we use the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge model (ATT&CK). The matrix covers hundreds of techniques, and can be applied for different purposes. In this case, we will focus on the risk versus mapping the defensive architecture.

In Q1 of 2018, we mapped the targeted attacks discovered by ourselves and our peers in the industry. The following example comes from one adversary we tracked, showing the techniques they used:

With MITRE’s Navigator tool you can select an actor or malware family. After making the selection, the boxes in the matrix show which techniques the actor or malware has used.

From these techniques we can learn how our environments protect against these techniques and where we have gaps. The goal is not to create coverage or signatures for each technique; the matrix helps organizations understand how attackers behave. Having more visibility into their methods leads us to the right responses, and helps us contain and eradicate attacks in a coordinated way. By comparing the multiple actors from your initial risk assessment, you can build the matrix from the perspective of high/medium/low risk and map it against your defenses.

Although some adversaries might not have a history of attacking you and your sector, it is still good to ask yourself “What if we were a target?” Would your environment create enough visibility to detect and deal with these techniques?


When we looked at the first quarter, we noticed that the three techniques were the most popular in the category of Privilege Escalation:

  • Exploitation of vulnerability
  • Process injection
  • Valid accounts

To determine your coverage and detection capacity, you should ask if the exploits used completely new vulnerabilities (no patches available) or if they had existed for a while. Would your environment have the right patches installed or are you missing them and have to take action?

When we looked at the categories of Exfiltration and Command and Control, most campaigns exfiltrated their data over a control server channel using a common port. That translates to either TCP port 80 (HTTP) or TCP port 443 (HTTPS). We all use these ports from inside the network to communicate to the internet. What if all my other defenses would fail to discover the suspicious activity? Which defensive components in my network would be able to inspect the outgoing traffic and block or flag the exfiltration attempts?


In this post, we highlighted one approach and application of the ATT&CK model. There are many ways to apply it for red teaming, threat hunting, and other tasks. At McAfee we embrace the model and are applying it to different levels and purposes in our organization. We are not only using it but also contribute to the model by describing newly discovered techniques used by adversaries.

The post Apply MITRE’s ‘ATT&CK’ Model to Check Your Defenses appeared first on McAfee Blogs.

Jun 14 2018

Unintended Clipboard Paste Function in Windows 10 Leads to Information Leak in RS1

The McAfee Labs Advanced Threat Research team has been investigating the Windows 10 platform. We have submitted several vulnerabilities already and have disclosed our research to Microsoft. Please refer to our vulnerability disclosure policy for further details or the post from earlier this week on Windows 10 Cortana vulnerabilities.

Early last year, a trivial “information leak” was reported in Windows 10. This technique no longer works on most current builds of Windows 10, but a variation of this simple method works quite well on some versions of Windows 10, specifically RS1 (RedStone 1).

The issue is simple to describe and execute. For a local attack, you can use a physical keyboard; if there is a network vector that would allow one to remotely reach the Windows login screen (such as RDP), you can use the software-based keyboard accessible from the lock screen. On all versions of Windows 10, the “paste” function appears to be intentionally forbidden from the Windows lock screen, including the “Hey Cortana” function. The original finding demonstrated CTRL+V could be used to paste clipboard contents. This is now disabled, even on RS1. However, we have found a way to bypass this restriction using the keyboard shortcut CTRL + SHIFT + INSERT, allowing us to access in plain text the clipboard contents, whatever they may be. While we are continuing to explore this technique to force-copy functions (and access arbitrary content), for now we can access whatever happens to be copied. In the demo this is a password allowing login.

The post Unintended Clipboard Paste Function in Windows 10 Leads to Information Leak in RS1 appeared first on McAfee Blogs.

Jun 12 2018

Want to Break Into a Locked Windows 10 Device? Ask Cortana (CVE-2018-8140)

June’s “Patch Tuesday” (June 12) is here, but it is likely many Windows 10 users have not yet applied these updates. If you have not, just be sure not to leave your laptop lying around! The patches in this cycle fix a code execution vulnerability using the default settings for Windows 10 and the “Cortana” voice assistant. We’ll detail how this vulnerability can be used to execute code from the locked screen of a fully patched Windows 10 machine (RS3 at the time of our original submission, and confirmed on RS4 prior to this patch cycle). The vulnerability was submitted to Microsoft as part of the McAfee Labs Advanced Threat Research team’s responsible disclosure policy, on April 23. Attribution for this vulnerability submission goes to Cedric Cochin, Cyber Security Architect and Senior Principle Engineer.

In this post, we will address three vectors of research that have been combined by Microsoft and together represent CVE-2018-8140. The first of these is an information leak, but we’ll culminate with a demo showing full code execution to log in to a locked Windows device!

Using “Hey Cortana!” to Retrieve Confidential Information

Personal digital assistants such as Siri, Alexa, Google Assistant, and Cortana have become commodities in many technologically inclined houses. From telling jokes, to helping with the grocery list, to turning on the kitchen lights, these robotic voices are beginning to feel oddly more and more personal as they expand their roles in our daily lives. However, we should consider the increased risk of built-in digital personal assistants when looking at new attack vectors for laptops, tablets, and smartphones. Our research on Microsoft’s Cortana voice assistant began after reading about the “BadUSB” attacks demonstrated by industry researchers. We decided to take this a step further and ended up finding and reporting to Microsoft several issues related to Cortana.

If you have spoken with Cortana, you may have noticed that “she” is very helpful for a number of simple tasks: providing definitions, or looking up corporations, movies, artists, or athletes. She can even do math! In Windows 10, on the most recent build at the time of submission, we observed that the default settings enable “Hey Cortana” from the lock screen, allowing anyone to interact with the voice-based assistant. This led to some interesting behavior and ultimately vulnerabilities allowing arbitrary code execution.

We begin this analysis with a quick look into Windows indexing. If you have ever opened the advanced view of the Windows Indexing control panel, and navigated to the File Types tab, you will see a long list of file extensions. For each of them you will find details about the associated filter used by the indexing process. Essentially you have the “file properties filter” and several other filters that could all be summarized as “file properties and file content filter.”

This means the index process will crack open the files and index their content, including some strings present in these documents. Let’s keep that in mind for later as we continue.

Using this knowledge, we wanted to try to access the same menu that you would see when using a Cortana search on an unlocked device.

This will come as a surprise and lies at the core of all the issues we found, but simply typing while Cortana starts to listen to a query on a locked device will bring up a Windows contextual menu, as shown below:

On top: the result of typing “pas” in the Cortana search field on an unlocked computer.
Above: the result of asking “Hey Cortana, P A S” and using a whitespace keyboard sequence.

In the preceding example, we queried Cortana for the term pas, no preamble to the question, just speaking the three letters, P. A. S. Why not “pass”? Because Cortana can be quite picky with verbal statements and there is no dictionary definition for “pass,” leading to Cortana inviting us to continue in Edge after unlocking the device. Alternatively, instead of issuing a verbal statement, we could click on the “tap and say” button and just start typing this text, for example.

We now have a contextual menu, displayed on a locked Windows 10 device. What could go wrong?

Remember that all the results presented by Cortana come from indexed files and applications, and that for some applications the content of the file is also indexed. Now we can simply hover over any of the relevant matches. If the match is driven by filename matching, then you will be presented with the full path of the file. If the match is driven by the file content matching, then you may be presented with the content of the file itself.

Keep in mind that the entire user folder structure is indexed, which includes the default location for most documents but also for mappings like OneDrive.

Example of data leakage using voice command with Cortana and the whitespace keyboard sequence.

Armed with this knowledge, you can use your imagination to come up with specific keywords that could be used to start harvesting confidential information from the locked device.

Code Execution from the Windows Lock Screen (User Interaction May be Required)

Next, we asked the question: Could we go a step further and get code execution in the context of the authenticated user? Remember we are using only a combination of voice commands and mouse/touchpad/touchscreen to gain access to the contextual menu at this point. We observed that just by hovering over a file, the full path or content of the file would be displayed. What happens if we were to click on it? That depends on the target. If the file being opened is an application or an executable (such as notepad or calc.exe), the file will run and be accessible only after the user properly logs in. If it is a document, script, or text file, it will be opened by an editor instead of being executed. At this point we can execute various preloaded Windows utilities such as calculator, but we cannot pass any parameters to the command line. We can open scripts including PowerShell, but instead of being executed, they will be opened in a text editor (notepad). The lack of parameters is a limitation for a “live off the land” attack, which uses current tools and content to achieve a malicious purpose; however, there are plenty of malicious activities that could be performed even with these restrictions. For example, many uninstallers will happily remove software without any need for parameters.

Let’s return to our goal: code execution from the lock screen. The only requirement for something to show up in the contextual menu is for it to be indexed.

Public folders indexed by default.

There are multiple ways for an unauthenticated attacker to get results to show up in the index of an authenticated user. One method relies on OneDrive. As the root of the OneDrive directory structure is in the user folder, all the OneDrive content is indexed by default. Basically, if you ever share a folder or file with “edit” rights, the person you share it with, as well as any other recipients of a forwarded link, can now drop a file that will be indexed. With the file indexed we have multiple options to proceed.

Option 1: Drop an Executable File

This method assumes you can write an executable file to the disk; it does not require you to have executed it. Via a phishing attack or another vulnerability, an attacker could drop a backdoor (for example, Cobalt Strike Beacon or Meterpreter) and be in business. If you need to execute the payload as an administrator, you can simply right-click (for a touchscreen this is a longer-hold screen press) and select “Run as administrator.”

When running applications that do not have the Auto-Elevate Privilege, you will trigger a user account control (UAC) prompt and nothing will execute. This could still result in a valid attack because users rarely check the content of the prompt and often proceed through the warning dialog box. The attacker would have to execute the program, and then wait for the authenticated user to log in and finish the job. If the application has auto-elevate privileges, there will be no UAC prompt and the application will execute at high integrity.

This is interesting behavior, but on its own not a very likely attack scenario, so let’s continue to explore our options. Why not simply use a USB key to drop the payload because we have physical access? The content of the USB key is not indexed, so it would not be presented as a result of the search query (although there are other ways to use a USB device; see below).

Option 2: Drop a non-PE Payload

Portable executable (PE) backdoors are great, but can we gain execution with a non-PE payload, for example, a PowerShell script?  We can use the same right-click capability to assist, but with a small twist. The right-click menu is not always the same, even for a given file type.

When you ask Cortana about “PS1,” you will be presented with your indexed PowerShell scripts. A right click will allow you to “open file location” or “copy full path,” but with no means of execution.

If you click on the file as we already mentioned, the file will open in edit mode. Curiously, it will not open the default editor (PowerShell ISE) for PowerShell scripts; instead, it will open the script in notepad. We assume this was intended as a security measure because notepad cannot execute scripts, unlike PowerShell ISE.

The default right-click menu for PS1 files.

Remember we mentioned that Cortana changes results based on your input query? When properly logged in, if you ask Cortana about “txt” using the query “Hey Cortana” followed by the letters “T,” “X,” “T,” she will present you with text documents, Notepad, and the most recent documents open by Notepad. Yet the right-click menu for items in the Recent category is different than the right-click menu for the same item in the Documents category.

At top:the context menu for a Recent item; above: the context menu for a Document item.

We follow a three-step process:

  • Land a PowerShell script in a location that will be indexed
    • Public folder, public share, or OneDrive
  • Execute a search query that will show the document and click on it
    • “Hey Cortana, PS1”
    • Select the PowerShell script you just indexed and left click
    • The PowerShell script opens in Notepad
  • Execute a search query that will show the recent documents, right click, and…
    • Using Cortana, type or search in the contextual menu for “txt”
    • Right click on the PowerShell script in the Recent category under the Apps tab at the top (not Documents)
    • Click “Run with PowerShell”

“Run with PowerShell” right-click menu option for Recent items.

We now have local code execution with the payload of our choosing, without any exploit, even if the device is encrypted, on an up-to-date locked Windows 10 device.

This technique helps us understand some of the differences between apps, documents, extensions, and the way Windows handles them from a locked or unlocked screen. Yet it probably does not represent much of a real-world attack vector. Then again, we are not finished.

Logging into a Locked Device with no User Interaction

Finally, we have local code execution, but with some real limitations. We need to get our payload indexed but we cannot pass command-line parameters. This could be a limiting factor for our PowerShell attack vector because the execution policy may prevent its execution, and without command-line parameters we cannot pass an “-ExecutionPolicy Bypass” (or any other flavor). We would also have to find a way to land a PS1 script on the victim’s box, and have remote access to the physical machine or the login screen.

The techniques we have described so far are far too complicated compared with the simplicity and effectiveness of what comes next.

You recall the use of the keyboard-timing sequence to trigger the contextual search menu from a locked screen while querying Cortana. Any keystroke can trigger the menu from the time when Cortana begins to listen to when the answer is displayed. Press any key at this point; we like to use the spacebar because you cannot backspace and Windows will nicely ignore or trim out the space in its text results anyways. Invoke keyboard input too early or before Cortana is listening and you will be prompted to enter your password; invoke too late and Cortana goes back to sleep or returns normal results without a context menu.

It is not very intuitive to use the keyboard in addition of voice commands, but you can type your search the same way you do on an unlocked device, assuming that you triggered Cortana to listen.

The following screenshot demonstrates this behavior:

  • Trigger Cortana via “Tap and Say” or “Hey Cortana”
  • Ask a question (this is more reliable) such as “What time is it?”
  • Press the space bar, and the context menu appears
  • Press esc, and the menu disappears
  • Press the space bar again, and the contextual menu appears, but this time the search query is empty
  • Start typing (you cannot use backspace). If you make a mistake, press esc and start again.
  • When done (carefully) typing your command, click on the entry in the Command category. (This category will appear only after the input is recognized as a command.)
  • You can always right click and select “Run as Administrator” (but remember the user would have to log in to clear the UAC)

You can use the following example of a simple PowerShell command to test. Enjoy the soothing beeps that demonstrate code execution from a locked device.

What can we do at this point? You name it. Our demo shows a password reset and login on a Windows 10 build, using only this simple technique.

The easiest mitigation technique, in the absence of patching the device (which we strongly recommend), is to turn off Cortana on the lock screen. This week’s Patch Tuesday from Microsoft contains fixes for these issues under CVE-2018-8140.

This concludes our examination of Cortana (at least for now). The McAfee Advanced Threat Research team has a fundamental goal of eliminating critical threats to the hardware and software we use; this month’s patch is a clear step toward furthering that goal. The attack surface created by vocal commands and personal digital assistants requires much more investigation; we are just scratching the surface of the amount of research that should be conducted in this critical area.

The post Want to Break Into a Locked Windows 10 Device? Ask Cortana (CVE-2018-8140) appeared first on McAfee Blogs.