Category: Endpoint Protection

Aug 14 2018

McAfee ePO Platform Gains Insight Into Threat Research

The latest update to the McAfee® ePolicy Orchestrator® platform offers a new add-in to provide insight into the latest analysis carried out by McAfee Labs and the Advanced Threat Research team. The Security Resources section of the McAfee ePO™ console Version 5.10.0 will contain multiple windows providing the latest news.

The first window in the section shows an updated list of the most recent threats research published by the McAfee Labs team. This includes both malware and vulnerability research. For example, this week we released a report that shows it is possible to emulate and modify a patient’s vital signs in real time on a medical network using a patient monitor and central monitoring station. We also include research related to new malware campaigns. All our content is mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework and includes all known indicators of compromise, as well as detailing how McAfee products protect against the documented campaign.

Top threats

The section includes a condensed version of the Threat Landscape Dashboard, which contains the top threats across exploit kits, campaigns, ransomware, and vulnerabilities. The following screen shows how the summary will appear in the McAfee ePO console, allowing readers to easily review and click through these threats for more detail.

The latest McAfee ePO console will offer an easy review of analysis gathered by McAfee Labs and the Advanced Threat Research team.

Top stories
Want to know more? The Top Stories section offers the latest information from McAfee news sources, including new product releases and new blog content (beyond threats analysis).

Support and product advisories

At the bottom right of the screen you will find Security Product Advisories:

  • Support Notification Service: McAfee SNS is a proactive notification service that allows McAfee to communicate critical information in a timely manner on product upgrades, releases, and end-of-life notices. SNS is a vital information link during critical incidents, providing you with the updates you need to ensure that your systems and organization are protected.
  • Product Security Bulletins: McAfee is focused on ensuring the security of our customers’ computers, networks, devices, and data. We are committed to rapidly addressing issues as they arise, and providing recommendations through security bulletins and knowledgebase articles.
  • McAfee Labs Security Advisories: These are a free notification service backed by our global research team. McAfee Labs Security Advisories map high-profile threats to the McAfee technologies that protect your environment.

What next?

You can expect the dashboard to evolve and provide more detail in future versions. Please let us know what you would like to see.

 

The post McAfee ePO Platform Gains Insight Into Threat Research appeared first on McAfee Blogs.

Aug 14 2018

Microsoft Cortana Allows Browser Navigation Without Login: CVE-2018-8253

A locked Windows 10 device with Cortana enabled on the lock screen allows an attacker with physical access to the device to do two kinds of unauthorized browsing. In the first case, the attacker can force Microsoft Edge to navigate to an attacker-controlled URL; in the second, the attacker can use a limited version of Internet Explorer 11 using the saved credentials of the victim.

In June we published our analysis of a full login bypass mechanism for all Windows 10 devices for which Cortana is enabled on the lock screen. (This is still the default option.) The discovery of the full login bypass was part of a wider research effort into what access the digital assistant Cortana might offer to an adversary when the device is locked. This post details these two additional issues; we reported them to Microsoft at the same time we reported the login bypass. The two new flaws have now been addressed as part of Microsoft’s August update. Some of the issues are also partially mitigated by modifying the answer obtained from a Bing search query.

In the first scenario, a Cortana privilege escalation leads to forced navigation on a lock screen. The vulnerability does not allow an attacker to unlock the device, but it does allow someone with physical access to force Edge to navigate to a page of the attacker’s choosing while the device is still locked. This is not a case of BadUSB, man in the middle, or rogue Wi-Fi, just simple voice commands and interacting with the device’s touchscreen or mouse.

Several months ago, researchers from Israel demonstrated a similar attack using a BadUSB device, masquerading as a network interface card to inject content into trusted HTTP sites while using Cortana to force navigation. Microsoft has since removed this ability to navigate directly to a domain and instead now opens a search in Bing over HTTPS to the domain in question. Some of our findings could also be combined with a BadUSB approach.

We explored whether one could still force navigation to an attacker-controlled page. In short, yes, one can, but it does take some extra effort.

Cortana is very helpful when it comes to defining terms, or looking up corporations, movies, artists, or athletes. She can even do math. However, Cortana’s behavior and the answers she gives are affected by the way you ask a question. For example, if you were to ask the colloquial question “Hey Cortana, what is McAfee?” you would get a quick answer directly from a Bing search. If, however, you asked only “Hey Cortana, McAfee,” you would receive a more detailed response, including links to various trusted sites. These include Wikipedia, Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, and the “official website” (more later on this important link).

Cortana’s answers to similar but not identical queries about “McAfee.”

It is surprising that links are offered and clickable when the device is locked. If you start your favorite network sniffer or man-in-the-middle proxy, you will see that the links are visited as soon as the user clicks on them, irrespective of the device’s locked status.

This means we can force navigation to a website (though not yet the one we want) when the device is locked. However, we have seen that Cortana can be picky in how she offers results. Bing must already know these results, and most links are known trusted sites.

That leaves us with the official website. You might recognize this terminology: It is a common link presented by Wikipedia. If you look at the bottom of a Wikipedia article, you will often find a link to an official website.

Could Cortana just use Wikipedia as a trusted source? After a few delightful conversations with her, we can confirm that the official website for items she refers from Wikipedia is indeed the same as the Official Website link on Wikipedia. There is no one-to-one correlation on Wikipedia’s official website for Cortana to display the corresponding link. We assume there is some possible weighting of the domain name or logic in the Bing output that influences Cortana’s displayed links.

We can leverage this information to craft a fake Wikipedia entry, add enough content to get the review to succeed, add an official website link, and see what Cortana presents. Wikipedia reviewers do a pretty good job of vetting content, but we also need Bing to become aware of the entry so that Cortana could offer the answer and the link. Because of the time-dependent factor of the approach (and the ethical aspect of tampering with Wikipedia content in a malicious way), we decided to take a different path—although others could use this attack vector.

Instead of creating an entry in Wikipedia, making sure that Bing indexes it and that Cortana provides the official website link, we opted for an alternative. We can instead hunt Wikipedia for unmaintained or dead official website links. Fortunately for us, Wikipedia maintains a list of “dead links” and “permanent dead links.” A search for “Xbox Linux” looks like this:

To aid in our hunt, Wikipedia has a fairly robust search engine that accepts regular expressions.

With just a little bit of tinkering we come up with the following search:

insource:/\{official (website)?\|https?\:\/\/[^}]+\.com\/[^}]\}\}\{\{dead link/

This is neither an exhaustive list, nor the most efficient regular expression, but it does find some candidates without triggering the Wikipedia query timeout.

The next step is to write a script to parse the output, grab a list of domains, and check whether they are actually vacant. Many of them are still registered but do not serve any content; others are live despite the “dead link” tag. We end up with a list of domains, some more expensive than others, that are vacant.

What will Cortana display for each of these Wikipedia entries? One after another, we ask. Retrospectively, writing a text-to-speech script would have been faster. Cortana answers surprisingly well to other digital speech synthesizers.

Many of the entries do not provide the official website link, but some do. It is annoying that the way you ask the question interferes with the results. Not only is the phrasing of the question important; the decision of whether to dictate a word or spell it out may change the answer. To obtain the answer you want from Cortana, you may have to combine both approaches.

For example, we asked “Hey Cortana, what is Miss Aruba?” We saw, while the device was locked, the following answer:

The official website link points to “hxxp://www.missaruba.aw.” A quick search shows the domain is still available.

In conclusion, we now have Wikipedia articles for which Cortana will display an official website link, and for which the domain is available for purchase. After spending $11.99 for a cheaper domain, we own one.

Although it took some regular-expression authoring, some scripting, and buying a domain, this method was faster and more satisfying than waiting for Bing to publish and index a new Wikipedia entry.

After this setup, what can we accomplish? We can ask Cortana (either via the interactive icon or vocal command “Hey Cortana”) to conduct a search while the device is locked. When she replies, we can click on the official website link and observe as Edge retrieves the content while the device remains locked.  To put a malicious spin on this unauthorized access, we have at least one straightforward option. We could install the latest exploit kit on our newly acquired domain and infect any locked Windows 10 PC with Cortana enabled without ever logging in. This attack could occur at a coffee shop, retailer, bank, or against targeted individuals. This configuration is the default on Windows, and our research has shown that many users never disable Cortana from the lock screen.

Digital voice assistants can be useful, but they must also be considered an attack vector. Although some may think this is a “noisy” vector, not applicable when stealth is required, you can employ techniques such as the DolphinAttack, which uses inaudible voice commands to close an air gap. Or if you have physical access to the device, a $5 3.5mm-jack cable will do as well.

An inexpensive 3.5mm-jack cable for silent interaction.

How can we protect against this attack vector? You can disable Cortana on your lock screen. Microsoft should not allow navigation to untrusted websites until it receives permission from the authenticated user, confirming on login that the user wants to visit a site.

Self-service Internet Explorer from the Windows lock screen

When we investigate a technology, we sometimes find that our initial findings are less substantial than what we learn after further investigation. Our research into Cortana and this attack surface was no different. What if one could surf the web freely with a full-fledged browser such as Internet Explorer 11, with access to cached credentials and autocomplete on a locked Windows 10 device? All thanks to Cortana? That could be much more impactful than browsing to just one URL.

That is possible with Cortana’s skills. It makes sense that Cortana offers skills similar to those of Amazon’s Alexa or Google Assistant. But it does not make sense to offer these skills directly from the lock screen when they are not yet configured.

One example is the “Real Estate Search” skill. While conversing with Cortana to analyze the capabilities she could offer an attacker, we found that she occasionally offered to try skills, including Real Estate Search.

One easy trigger is to ask “Hey Cortana, I want to sell my house.” This leads to the following screen:

If we click “Real Estate Search,” we get a login screen. Instead of logging in, let’s look at the other links offered by the interface. In the current case, the “Privacy Policy” link seems interesting:

Cortana’s skill login screen with a link to Privacy Policy.

Opening the link, we see a lengthy policy. If we scroll to the bottom of the page, we discover a few social media icons:

Privacy policy screen with links to social media sites.

These icons are indeed links, allowing us to reach Facebook or YouTube, and from there the rest of the Internet:

Reaching Facebook from the lock screen of a Windows 10 system.

Let’s summarize. You left for lunch with your new Windows Surface Book locked on your desk. Cortana is on by default on your lock screen. Your disk is encrypted. What could go wrong?

Anybody who has physical access to your locked device can start browsing the web. What if someone were to navigate to a work-unfriendly website from your device, or post inflammatory comments in a public forum that could be attributed to your device’s IP address?

A device-specific attribution would be bad, but could you use the same method to post or access something from a real person’s name or account? We next investigated which browser is being used? Is it a Cortana custom browser? Is it a sandboxed Microsoft Edge? It is actually a customized Internet Explorer 11 restricted engine running in the context of AuthHost.exe. (We will publish another analysis on this limited “browser” because its properties and lack of security mechanisms could become handy for red teams.)

This is the Internet Explorer engine and not the full browser, though both JavaScript and cookies are enabled. Worse, this incarnation shares the autocomplete and credentials saved in the context of the current user’s Internet Explorer session.

Thus in addition to posting a comment on a public forum from another user’s device while the device is locked, you can also impersonate the user thanks to its cached credentials.

One potential attack scenario arises if a corporation offers a mechanism to reset Windows credentials via a web server but does not require users to reenter the old password. One could simply navigate to the reset link, input a new password, exit the limited navigator, and unlock the device with the newly set password, all from a locked computer.

We have explored a couple of attack scenarios and security issues in this post, and we will continue our investigation into Cortana and other digital assistants as an attack vector. Your best mitigation at this point is to turn off Cortana on the lock screen. Here is a good tutorial on how to do so.

 

The post Microsoft Cortana Allows Browser Navigation Without Login: CVE-2018-8253 appeared first on McAfee Blogs.

Jul 31 2018

GandCrab Ransomware Puts the Pinch on Victims

The GandCrab ransomware first appeared in January and has updated itself rapidly during its short life. It is the leading ransomware threat. The McAfee Advanced Threat Research team has reverse engineered Versions 4.0 through 4.2 of the malware.

The first versions (1.0 and 1.1) of this malware had a bug that left the keys in memory because the author did not correctly use the flags in a crypto function. One antimalware company released a free decryption tool, posted on NoMoreRansom.org.

The hack was confirmed by the malware author in a Russian forum:

Figure 1. Confirmation by the author of the hack of GandCrab servers.

The text apologizes to partners for the hack and temporarily shuts down the program. It promises to release an improved version within a few days.

The second version of GandCrab quickly appeared and improved the malware server’s security against future counterattacks. The first versions of the ransomware had a list of file extensions to encrypt, but the second and later versions have replaced this list with an exclusion list. All files except those on the list were encrypted.

Old versions of the malware used RSA and AES to encrypt the files, and communicated with a control server to send the RSA keys locked with an RC4 algorithm.

The GandCrab author has moved quickly to improve the code and has added comments to mock the security community, law agencies, and the NoMoreRansom organization. The malware is not professionally developed and usually has bugs (even in Version 4.2), but the speed of changes is impressive and increases the difficulty of combating it.

Entry vector

GandCrab uses several entry vectors:

  • Remote desktop connections with weak security or bought in underground forums
  • Phishing emails with links or attachments
  • Trojanized legitimate programs containing the malware, or downloading and launching it
  • Exploits kits such as RigEK and others

The goal of GandCrab, as with other ransomware, is to encrypt all or many files on an infected system and insist on payment to unlock them. The developer requires payment in cryptocurrency, primarily DASH, because it complex to track, or Bitcoin.

The malware is usually but not always packed. We have seen variants in .exe format (the primary form) along with DLLs. GandCrab is effectively ransomware as a service; its operators can choose which version they want.

Version 4.0

The most important change in Version 4.0 is in the algorithm used to encrypt files. Earlier versions used RSA and AES; the latest versions use Salsa20. The main reason is for speed. RSA is a powerful but slow algorithm. Salsa20 is quick and the implementation is small.

The ransomware checks the language of the system and will not drop the malicious payload if the infected machine operates in Russian or certain other former Soviet languages:

Figure 2. Checking the language of the infected system.

GandCrab encrypts any file that does not appear on the following file-extension exclusion list:

The ransomware does not encrypt files in these folders:

GandCrab leaves these files unencrypted:

The ransomware generates a pair of RSA keys before encrypting any file. The public key encrypts the Salsa20 key and random initialization vector (IV, or nonce)) generated later for each file.

The encryption procedure generates a random Salsa20 key and a random IV for each file, encrypts the file with them, and encrypts this key and IV with a pair of RSA keys (with the public RSA key created at the beginning). The private key remains encrypted in the registry using another Salsa20 key and IV encrypted with an RSA public key embedded in the malware.

After encryption, the file key and IV are appended to the contents of the file in a new field of 8 bytes, increasing the original file size.

This method makes GandCrab very strong ransomware because without the private key to the embedded public key, it is not possible to decrypt the files. Without the new RSA private key, we cannot decrypt the Salsa20 key and IV that are appended to the file.

Finally, the ransomware deletes all shadow volumes on the infected machine and deletes itself.

Version 4.1

This version retains the Salsa20 algorithm, fixes some bugs, and adds a new function. This function, in a random procedure from a big list of domains, creates a final path and sends the encrypted information gathered from the infected machine. We do not know why the malware does this; the random procedure usually creates paths to remote sites that do not exist.

For example, one sample of this version has the following hardcoded list of encrypted domains. (This is only a small part of this list.)

The ransomware selects one domain from the list and creates a random path with one of these words:

Later it randomly chooses another word to add to the URL it creates:

Afterward it makes a file name, randomly choosing three or four combinations from the following list:

Finally the malware concatenates the filename with a randomly chosen extension:

At this point, the malware sends the encrypted information using POST to the newly generated URL for all domains in the embedded list, repeating the process of generating a path and name for each domain.

Another important change in this version is the attempt to obfuscate the calls to functions such as VirtualAlloc and VirtualFree.

Figure 3. New functions to obfuscate the code.

Version 4.1.2

This version has appeared with some variants. Two security companies revealed a vaccine to prevent infections by previous versions. The vaccine involved making a special file in a folder with a special name before the ransomware infects the system. If this file exists, the ransomware finishes without dropping the payload.

The file gets its name from the serial number of the Windows logic unit hard disk value. The malware makes a simple calculation with this name and creates it in the %appdata% or %program files% folder (based in the OS) with the extension .lock.

Figure 4. Creating the special file.

The GandCrab author reacted quickly, changing the operation to make this value unique and use the Salsa20 algorithm with an embedded key and IV with text referring to these companies. The text and the value calculated were used to make the filename; the extension remained .lock.

One of the security companies responded by making a free tool to make this file available for all users, but within hours the author released another Version 4.1.2 with the text changed. The malware no longer creates any file, instead making a mutex object with this special name. The mutex remains and keeps the .lock extension in the name.


Figure 5. Creating a special mutex instead of a special lock file.

The vaccine does not work with the second Version 4.1.2 and Version 4.2, but it does work with previous versions.

Version 4.2

This version has code to detect virtual machines and stop running the ransomware within them.

It checks the number of remote units, the size of the ransomware running compared with certain sizes, installs a VectoredExceptionHandler, and checks for VMware virtual machines using the old trick of the virtual port in a little encrypted shellcode:

Figure 6. Detecting VMware.

The malware calculates the free space of the main Windows installation logic unit and finally calculates a value.

If this value is correct for the ransomware, it runs normally. If the value is less than 0x1E, it waits one hour to start the normal process. (It blocks automatic systems that do not have “sleep” prepared.) If the value is greater than 0x1E, the ransomware finishes its execution.

Figure 7. Checking for virtual machines and choosing a path.

Conclusion

GandCrab is the leading ransomware threat for any person or enterprise. The author uses many ways to install it—including exploits kits, phishing mails, Trojans, and fake programs. The developer actively updates and improves the code to make analysis more difficult and to detect virtual machines. The code not is professionally written and continues to suffer from bugs, yet the product is well promoted in underground forums and has increased in value.

McAfee detects this threat as Ran-GandCrab4 in Versions 4.0 and later. Previous ones are also detected.

Indicators of compromise

MITRE ATT&CK

This sample uses the following MITRE ATT&CK techniques:

  • File deletion
  • System information discovery
  • Execution through API
  • Execution through WMIC
  • Application process discovery: to detect antimalware and security products as well as normal programs
  • Query registry: to get information about keys that the malware needs make or read
  • Modify registry
  • File and directory discovery: to search for files to encrypt
  • Encrypt files
  • Process discovery: enumerating all processes on the endpoint to kill some special ones
  • Create files
  • Elevation of privileges

Hashes

  • 9a80f1866450f2f10fa69b1eb8747c344d6ef038468014c59cc50497f9e4675d – version 4.0
  • d9466be5c387eb2fbf619a8cd0922b167ea7fa06b63f13cd330ca974cae1d513 – version 4.0
  • 43b57d2b16c44041916f3b0562712d5dca4f8a42bc00f00a023b4a0788d18276 – version 4.0
  • 786e3c693fcdf55466fd6e5446de7cfeb58a4311442e0bc99ce0b0985c77b45d – version 4.0
  • f5e74d939a5b329dddc94b75bd770d11c8f9cc3a640dccd8dff765b6997809f2 – version 4.1
  • 8ecbfe6f52ae98b5c9e406459804c4ba7f110e71716ebf05015a3a99c995baa1 – version 4.1
  • e454123d852e6a40eed1f2552e1a1ad3c00991541d812fbf24b70611bd1ec40a – version 4.1
  • 0aef79fac6331f9eca49e711291ac116e7f6fbaeb5a1f3eb7fea9e2e4ec6a608 – version 4.1
  • 3277c1649972ab5b43ae9e87087b70ea4825956bfdddd1034f7b0680e6d46efa – version 4.1
  • a92af825bd95b6514f22dea08a4eb6d3491cbad45e69a5b9653b0148ee9f9832 – version 4.1
  • ce093ffa19f020a2b73719f653b5e0423df28ef1d59035d55e99154a85c5c668 – version 4.1.2 (first)
  • a1aae5ae7a3722b83dc1c9b0831c973641b246808de4f3670f2fd916cf498d38 – version 4.1.2 (second)
  • 3b0096d6798b1887cffa1288583e93f70e656270119087ceb2f832b69b89260a – version 4.2
  • e8e948e36fed93061062406693d1b2c402dd8e5788506bfbb50dbd86a5540829 – version 4.2

Domain

http://gandcrabmfe6mnef.onion

The post GandCrab Ransomware Puts the Pinch on Victims appeared first on McAfee Blogs.

Jul 26 2018

CactusTorch Fileless Threat Abuses .NET to Infect Victims

McAfee Labs has noticed a significant shift by some actors toward using trusted Windows executables, rather than external malware, to attack systems. One of the most popular techniques is a “fileless” attack. Because these attacks are launched through reputable executables, they are hard to detect. Both consumers and corporate users can fall victim to this threat. In corporate environments, attackers use this vector to move laterally through the network.

One fileless threat, CactusTorch, uses the DotNetToJScript technique, which loads and executes malicious .NET assemblies straight from memory. These assemblies are the smallest unit of deployment of an application, such as a .dll or .exe. As with other fileless attack techniques, DotNetToJScript does not write any part of the malicious .NET assembly on a computer’s hard drive; hence traditional file scanners fail to detect these attacks.

In 2018 we have seen rapid growth in the use of CactusTorch, which can execute custom shellcode on Windows systems. The following chart shows the rise of CactusTorch variants in the wild.

Source: McAfee Labs.

The DotNetToJScript tool kit

Compiling the DotNetToJScript tool gives us the .NET executable DotNetToJScript.exe, which accepts the path of a .NET assembly and outputs a JavaScript file.

 

Figure 1: Using DotNetToJScript.exe to create a malicious JavaScript file.

The DotNetToJScript tool kit is never shipped with malware. The only component created is the output JavaScript file, which is executed on the target system by the script host (wscript.exe). For our analysis, we ran some basic deobfuscation and found CactusTorch, which had been hidden by some online tools:

Figure 2: CactusTorch code.

Before we dive into this code, we need to understand .NET and its COM exposure. When we install the .NET framework on any system, several .NET libraries are exposed via Microsoft’s Component Object Model (COM).

Figure 3: COM exposing the .NET library System.Security.Cryptography.FromBase64Transform.

If we look at the exposed interfaces, we can see IDispatch, which allows the COM object to be accessed from the script host or a browser.

Figure 4: Exposed interfaces in a .NET library.

To execute malicious code using the DotNetToJScript vector, an attack uses the following COM objects:

  • Text.ASCIIEncoding
  • Security.Cryptography.FromBase64Transform
  • IO.MemoryStream
  • Runtime.Serialization.Formatters.Binary.BinaryFormatter
  • Collections.ArrayList

Now, let’s return to the JavaScript code we saw in Figure 2. The function base64ToStream()converts the Base64-encoded serialized object to a stream. Before we can fully understand the logic behind the JavaScript code, we need to examine the functionality of the Base64-encoded serialized object. Thus our next step is to reverse engineer the embedded serialized object and recreate the class definition. Once that was done, the class definition looks like the following code, which is responsible for executing the malicious shellcode. (Special thanks to Casey Smith, @subTee, for important pointers regarding this step).

Figure 5: The class definition of the embedded serialized object.

Now we have the open-source component of CactusTorch, and the JavaScript code in Figure 2 makes sense. We can see how the malicious shellcode is executed on the targeted system. In Figure 2, line 29 the code invokes the flame(x,x) function with two arguments: the executable to launch and the shellcode.

The .NET assembly embedded in the CactusTorch script runs the following steps to execute the malicious shellcode:

  • Launches a new suspended process using CreateProcessA (to host the shellcode)
  • Allocates some memory with VirtualAllocEx() with an EXECUTE_READWRITE privilege
  • Writes the shellcode in the target’s process memory with WriteProcessMemory()
  • Creates a new thread to execute the shellcode using CreateRemoteThread()

Conclusion

Fileless malware takes advantage of the trust factor between security software and genuine, signed Windows applications. Because this type of attack is launched through reputable, trusted executables, these attacks are hard to detect. McAfee Endpoint Security (ENS) and Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) customers are protected from this class of fileless attack through Signature ID 6118.

 

Acknowledgements

The author thanks the following colleagues for their help with this analysis:

  • Abhishek Karnik
  • Deepak Setty
  • Oliver Devane
  • Shruti Suman

References

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

  • Drive-by compromise
  • Scripting using Windows Script Host
  • Decode information
  • Command-line interface
  • Process injection

Hashes

  • 4CF9863C8D60F7A977E9DBE4DB270819
  • 5EEFBB10D0169D586640DA8C42DD54BE
  • 69A2B582ED453A90CC06345886F03833
  • 74172E8B1F9B7F9DB600C57E07368B8F
  • 86C47B9E0F43150FEFF5968CF4882EBB
  • 89F87F60137E9081F40E7D9AD5FA8DEF
  • 8A33BF71E8740BDDE23425BBC6259D8F
  • 8DCCC9539A499D375A069131F3E06610
  • 924B7FB00E930082CE5B96835FDE69A1
  • B60E085150D53FCE271CD481435C6E1E
  • BC7923B43D4C83D077153202D84EA603
  • C1A7315FB68043277EE57BDBD2950503
  • D2095F2C1D8C25AF2C2C7AF7F4DD4908
  • D5A07C27A8BBCCD0234C81D7B1843FD4
  • E0573E624953A403A2335EEC7FFB1D83
  • E1677A25A047097E679676A459C63A42
  • F0BC5DFD755B7765537B6A934CA6DBDC
  • F6526E6B943A6C17A2CC96DD122B211E
  • CDB73CC7D00A2ABB42A76F7DFABA94E1
  • D4EB24F9EB1244A5BEAA19CF69434127

 

The post CactusTorch Fileless Threat Abuses .NET to Infect Victims appeared first on McAfee Blogs.