GlobalSign gives itself clean bill of health after Iranian hacker’s braggadocio

Following the widely-publicised disgrace of Dutch digital certificate issuer DigiNotar, a person calling himself ComodoHacker claimed that he’d breached four other Certificate Authorities (CAs), too.

Only one of these CAs was named: GlobalSign, the world’s fifth-biggest issuer of digital certificates.

In my opinion, GlobalSign would have been justified in ignoring this claim altogether.

It comes across as a stream of made-up, self-serving puffery, including bluster like this:

You see? I'm so smart, sharp, dangerous, powerful, etc. huh?

May I also start a web hacking course for Anonymous and Lulzsec and friends of them, Rootkit development for Stuxnet developers, 0-day vuln. assessment in Windows and Linux environment for Stuxnet developers and other hackers too. huh? What do you think?

WOOOOORLLLLDDD! Wait for me, you have so much more SHOCKINGS to see from me! From a person who came to this world just 21 years ago! JUST WAIT!

But GlobalSign decided, like Shakespeare’s Falstaff, that the better part of valour is discretion.

The company suspended its certificate-issuing business to investigate whether ComodoHacker’s unlikely claims might have a whiff of truth. GlobalSign even retained Fox-IT, the consultants called in to investigate the DigiNotar disaster, for some objective outside help.

The good news is that everything at GlobalSign to do with certificate signing appears to be in good shape, and the company will resume business-as-usual this week.

The bad news, of course, is that the company had a week’s business outage as a result.

Ironically, even after GlobalSign had given itself the all-clear in respect of certificate signing, it reported an apparently-inconsequential breach against its web server.

Any sort of breach is bad news, of course, but I’m willing to overlook GlobalSign’s web server issues entirely. I suspect that many companies wouldn’t have turned off part of their business voluntarily, and called in outside help, to investigate allegations of the sort made by ComodoHacker.

In fact, in most of Asia Pacific, where there are no data breach notification requirements at all, you might not hear from a company even if it knew it had suffered a Sony-sized leak of your data, let alone if it had spotted someone fiddling with its web server.

Hats off to GlobalSign in this matter.

Missing dots from email addresses opens 20GB data leak

Security researchers have captured 120,000 emails intended for Fortune 500 companies by exploiting a basic typo. The emails included trade secrets, business invoices, personal information about employees, network diagrams and passwords.

Researchers Peter Kim and Garrett Gee did this by buying 30 internet domains they thought people would send emails to by accident (a practice known as typosquatting).

The domain names they chose were all identical to subdomains used by Fortune 500 companies save for a missing dot.

Having purchased the domains they simply sat back and watched as users mistakenly sent them over 120,000 emails in six months.

Kim and Garrett have not identified their targets but have revealed that they were chosen from a list of 151 Fortune 500 companies they regarded as vulnerable to their variation of typosquatting. The list is jam-packed with household names like Dell, Microsoft, Halliburton, PepsiCo and Nike.

The emails they collected included some worryingly sensitive corporate information, including:

  • Passwords for an IT firm’s external Cisco routers
  • Precise details of the contents of a large oil company’s oil tankers
  • VPN details and passwords for a system managing road tollways

The researchers also warn of how easy it would have been to turn their passive typosquatting into an even more dangerous man-in-the-middle attack. Such an attack would have allowed them to capture entire email conversations rather than just individual stray emails.

To perform a man-in-the-middle attack an attacker would simply forward copies of any emails they receive to the addresses they were supposed to go to in the first place. The forwarded emails would be modified to contain a bogus return addresses owned by the attacker.

By forwarding and modifying emails in this way the attacker establishes themselves as a silent rely between all the individuals in the conversation.

Man in the Mailbox example attack

Typosquatting isn’t new so it’s striking that the researchers managed to capture so much information by focusing on just one common mistake. They captured 20GB of data in six months using only basic technical skills and 30 domains costing no more than a few dollars each.

A determined attacker with a modest budget could easily afford to buy domains covering a vast range of organisations and typos.

During their six month typosquat only one of the target companies took action against Kim and Garrett.

So how can you protect yourself from this kind of unwanted eavesdropping?

First and foremost make sure you encrypt and password protect sensitive data so that if it does end up in the wrong hands it can’t be used.

Organisations can also prevent emails being sent to specific misspelled domains through their DNS or mail server configurations. Of course this approach won’t prevent people outside your organisation from misspelling your domains.

To defend yourself against that you might defensively purchase domains that look like good typosquatting targets.

Finally if you believe somebody is using typosquatting to attack your company you may wish to file a Uniform Domain Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) against them.

If you’d like to read more about this research Peter Kim and Garrett Gee’s paper “Doppelganger Domains” is available to download from Wired.