The first rule of zero-days is no one talks about zero-days (so we’ll explain)

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How do you defend yourself against the unknown? That is crux of the zero-day vulnerability: a software vulnerability that, by definition, is unknown by the user of the software and often its developer as well.

Everything about the zero-day market, from research and discovery through disclosure and active exploitation, is predicated upon this fear of the unknown—a fear that has been amplified and distorted by the media. Is the world really at threat of destabilisation due to lone-wolf hackers digging up vulnerabilities in popular software packages and selling them to whichever repressive government offers the most money? Or is it just a classic case of the media and megacorp lobbyists focusing on the sexy, scary, offensive side of things, and glossing over the less alluring aspects?

And then what about legislation and regulation of zero-days? In most countries, there are scant legal mechanisms for discouraging or punishing the discovery of new zero-days. There are even fewer laws and directives dictating how zero-days should be responsibly disclosed. It isn't that lawmakers aren't aware of these problems, it's just that there isn't an easy solution. How do you craft a law that allows some research groups to keep on digging for vulnerabilities while at the same time blocking the black hats? What if the government's idea of "responsible disclosure" means disclosing all vulnerabilities to GCHQ or the NSA?

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As 0days get meaner, Google defenses increasingly outpace Microsoft

It's the type of bug that could have visited a world of hurt on a sizable number of people using Google Apps to manage business e-mail and calendars. A cross-site scripting (XSS) flaw in https://admin.google.com/ made it possible for attackers to force Google Apps admins to execute just about any request on that subdomain. Forced actions included creating new users with "super admin" rights, removing two-factor authentication and other security controls from existing accounts and modifying domain settings so e-mail is redirected to addresses controlled by the attacker.

But instead of causing disaster for businesses using Google Apps or generating headlines of an alarming new zero-day vulnerability, the bug was privately reported to Google on September 1 and fixed 17 days later. In exchange for the report, Google paid application security engineer Brett Buerhaus $5,000.

The speed and lack of fuss contrasts sharply with vulnerability travails that have recently visited Microsoft. Twice this month, the software company has been shamed when Project Zero, the vulnerability research team sponsored by Google, has publicly reported unfixed bugs that threaten the security of Windows users.

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